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Abstract: 
Discussions on the role of markets in healthcare easily lead to political and unfruitful polarized 
positions. Actors arguing in favour of markets as a solution for the quality/cost conundrum 
entrench themselves against others pointing out the risk of markets for the delivery and 
governance of healthcare. These binary options of more or less marketization preclude a more 
empirical analysis of how markets, as multiple arrangements, are constructed and what their 
consequences are for public values like affordability and quality. To empirically explore the 
relation between markets and public values in healthcare, in this paper we analyze the 
construction of a market for hospital care in the Netherlands, based on a system of diagnose-
related groups (DBCs), and the development of a market for long term care based on care-load 
packages (ZZPs). In these cases we address the intended result of care markets according to 
various policy actors, the visible and invisible work done by various actors to make markets work 
and the values enacted in market practices. We show that where policy aims within these 
markets focus on providing choice and increasing diversity of care institutions, the instruments 
of DBCs and ZZPs rather produce isomorphism and homogenization. Furthermore, the strong 
influence of financial instruments in shaping healthcare markets assume that cost and quality 
can both be strengthened while it in fact has a profound influence on how public values like 
quality get defined in practice. These translations between values pursued and outcomes 
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produced indicate that conceptualizing the role of the state as defining public values that 
markets (have to) implement is problematic, as this removes crucial normative work in the 
shaping of our welfare states to the realm of the technical operationalization of markets. An 
alternative relation between state, market and society can be conceived once we accept that such 
values are shaped in practice and that the relationship between policy aims and policy 
consequences can never be fully captured through a logic of implementation. This then calls for 
an experimental role of the state: a state that sees market developments as experimental devices 
in which the aim is a good composition of public values. We propose this experimentation could 
for example focus on market developments that do not ascribe a privileged status to financial 
devices and price-mechanism, such as a market for the DBC A-segment, in which prices are not 
freely negotiable. Such experiments could allow competition to focus on other public values like 
quality and maintaining accessibility while at the same time function as learning laboratories for 
reconceiving the role between state, market and society. 
 
Keywords: healthcare markets, public values, experimental state, composition.
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1 Introduction: Resisting rhetoric and opening the black-box of healthcare markets 
Early 2010, only one week after the Dutch Queen had accepted the resignation of the Labour 
party ministers and state secretaries, leaving the Netherlands in the hands of a caretaker 
government, former finance minister Wouter Bos of the Labour party announced that: 
“Increasing marketization in healthcare is not needed at this moment. What we need are 
hospitals and care professionals who cooperate. Rather than hospitals and care professionals 
who compete even harder with each other” (Bos in: van Dorrestein 2010). Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, this statement was soon followed by claims of the Dutch Healthcare Authority 
that a further extension of the part of hospital care for which prices are freely negotiable between 
hospital and healthcare insurance companies, would be warranted based on extrapolated 
findings on the relatively low increase of prices for such care (NZa 2010). The interim minister of 
healthcare, Ab Klink, soon afterwards announced that not continuing with such an increase, 
would lead to extra expenses that would inherently result in further cost-cutting or increased 
insurance fees at a later stage (van den Elsen 2010). He thereby tried to define the expansion of 
free price-mechanisms in healthcare as an issue that would fall under his care-taking 
jurisdiction, rather than as a controversial policy decision that would be postponed till after the 
elections. The Dutch House of Representatives however soon declared the extension of free 
price-mechanisms as exactly that: controversial and not to be decided upon by a caretaker 
government. 
 The observation that healthcare markets are highly controversial has been a rather 
common one among scholars studying the relations between markets and society. However, after 
the 2008 financial and economic crisis, policy makers and politicians in many Western states 
also increasingly discuss markets in controversial terms. The example of the controversy that 
emerged on the extension of free price-mechanisms in Dutch healthcare is more than just a sign 
of political polarization in the wake of newly announced elections: it is a telling example of two 
tendencies in debates on healthcare markets. First, it shows how debates on market mechanisms 
in healthcare are often framed in polemic terms that consist of binary options: more 
marketization or less marketization. Second, it shows that the evidence for whether a healthcare 
market works is often measured in financial terms, under the assumption that in well-
functioning markets, price reflects quality. Public values like quality are often part of the debate 
on healthcare markets, but are often based on general and slightly prophetic claims that 
apparently need not be empirically substantiatedi. 
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 Due to these tendencies, the political debate on marketization of healthcare is replete 
with rhetorical arguments by proponents and critics of ‘the market’, that monolithic entity whose 
properties are assumed to be known. It is precisely this ideological take on ‘the market’ in 
healthcare that obstructs a more empirical analysis of how markets, as multiple arrangements, 
are actually constructed and what consequences such specific market arrangements have for the 
realization and interrelation of public values like affordability and quality (Zuiderent-Jerak 
2009). Analyzing empirically how markets work has been proposed for decades, most notably by 
health economists (Schut 2009), and, if we permit a tad of whig history, the need for studying 
healthcare markets in all their empirical complexity was already proposed by Adam Smith in the 
Wealth of Nations (Smith 1776 (2000)). Smith stated that the free market would not work well 
in healthcare due to the relatively high cost of education that would sit uncomfortably with low 
prices for providing medical care at free market rate (Schut 2003). While the ‘free market’ 
anyway is the preferred notion for only 8% of the members of the American Economic 
Association (Klein and Stern 2007), health economists have been particularly weary of expecting 
positive results of liberalizing healthcare per se. As a result, many practical and theoretical 
efforts of health economists have focused on the construction of a healthcare market that does 
not depend on the ‘invisible hand’ ascertaining public values once healthcare markets are 
‘deregulated’, but that is built upon the notion developed by health economists of ‘regulated’ or 
‘managed competition’ (Enthoven 1988; Enthoven and van de Ven 2007). Though this notion 
has proven of no little importance in economic studies of the relation between state and markets, 
it does tend to operate from the assumption that markets implement public values that have 
been defined by politics. The success or failure of markets in doing so thereby is the main reason 
for scrutinizing markets empirically. The social studies of markets have a similar empirical focus, 
but rather than focusing on the implementation of public values, scholars in this field analyze 
how markets shape public values in practice (Callon 1998; Callon, Millo, and Muniesa 2007; 
MacKenzie, Muniesa, and Siu 2007). This approach thereby opens up the domain of the 
construction of market practices to a broader sociological enquiry of how different actors interact 
and what consequences these interactions have for the way public values play out in practice. In 
this paper we wish to explore what the value of such an approach is for the discussion on state, 
market and society in relation to healthcare markets. 
 Besides this sustained interest by health economists and the increasing interest from the 
social studies of markets, the relation between the responsibility of the state for ensuring public 
values and the development of (healthcare) markets have enjoyed substantial interest of policy-
makers at least since the 1980’s. Besides the rise of new public management (Pollit and 
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Bouckaert 2000) and other forms of neoliberal policy-making, the interest in market 
mechanisms to ensure public values has been influenced by a definition among policy scientists 
of public values and the role of governments in guaranteeing them. The reasoning here is that 
first, there is a difference between ‘societal’ and ‘public’ values (van der Grinten 2006). Societal 
values are those that are desirable for society as a whole, whereas these values become ‘public’ if 
government needs to intervene to ensure them. Government does this classification and once 
values are classified ‘public’, governments are required to develop policy measures to make sure 
these values are ensured. So far, so good, but markets do not play a role here. Markets have 
however been brought back in through the following analytical move: though government has a 
mandate to classify values as ‘public’, actually ensuring them can be delegated to other parties 
(WRR 2000). In this conceptualization of the role of the government in ensuring public values, 
market arrangements may be an efficient way to do so as it requires minimal state intervention. 
Reducing state involvement without reducing government responsibility was not only an 
important policy aim during the time this policy theory was developed (the 1980’s), it has also 
been an attractive and convenient policy model ever since, that was assumed equally applicable 
on markets for telecom, energy, housing or healthcare. 
 It is perhaps unsurprising that policy makers, policy scientists and (health) economists 
have been successful companions in designing health policy programs and putting them into 
practice. The policy wish, the policy theory, and the economic operationalization proved to 
match quite neatly and where Malcolm Ashmore, Michael Mulkay and Tervor Pinch in the late 
1980’s could still analyse how health economists were rather marginalized players acting from an 
underdog position towards clinicians and policy makers (Ashmore, Mulkay, and Pinch 1989), 
such economists have now become central policy actors, populating influential regulatory 
agencies throughout Western policy systems. 
 One of the problems with this approach of public values that are defined by government 
but can then be assured by other actors is that it assumes that, once defined, public values are 
implemented and remain static in that process. As social studies of markets have shown, this 
seems rather far from what happens in practice; repeated studies analyzed how the supposed 
operationalisations are far from neutral instruments that implement public values, but rather are 
active agents that shape what those very values are in practice (MacKenzie, Muniesa, and Siu 
2007; Sjögren and Helgesson 2007; MacKenzie and Millo 2003; Zuiderent-Jerak and van der 
Grinten 2009; Callon, Millo, and Muniesa 2007). If values are not designed and implemented 
but are shaped in their operationalization, this points to the limitations of the theoretically neat 
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solution of policy scientists and calls for the question how such values were intended and how 
they are being practically operationalized. Government agencies and other actors are 
continuously involved in the ongoing process of reconstructing these values in practice but at the 
same time operate from a policy theory of public values that precludes them from taking such co-
production processes systematically into account. On the contrary; the policy theory of public 
values that are defined, given to the operational agents as given values to be implemented makes 
the acting space of government agencies extremely limited, once these values have been 
delegated (Zuiderent-Jerak and van der Grinten 2009). The policy aim inherent in this approach 
thereby is that the assurance of public values can be realized through a government that is less 
involved in their operationalization. As this policy aim has proven empirically problematic, the 
question becomes how state and market relate to each other if their roles are no longer confined 
to the state defining public values that markets (have to) implement. 
In healthcare public values have classically been defined as consisting of the “trinity of 
quality, accessibility and affordability” of care (Connelly 1991; van der Grinten 2006). However 
clear this may seem, the precise meaning of these three values is constantly reshaped depending 
on the issue at stake (Zuiderent-Jerak and van der Grinten 2009). Given these limitations of the 
practical workability of the policy-scientific definition of public values and the role of 
governments in ensuring them, markets for policy domains such as healthcare do not seem to 
require the unambiguous definition of public values that can then be ensured through 
delegation; they rather require a permanent process of composition in the governance 
arrangements that are deployed for ensuring these values and shaping them in practice (Callon 
1987; Latour 2007; Zuiderent-Jerak and van der Grinten 2009). Ironically, markets thereby sit 
uncomfortably with notions of de-regulation and rather shift the regulatory tasks of policy actors 
to different sites: the active involvement in policy experiments that shape and contribute to 
public values. This implies an empirical turn to healthcare market practices of both policy 
scientists and policy makers, putting centre stage a study of markets in the making and their 
consequences in terms of public values. 
 Studying which values are built into which market arrangements, and analyzing how 
these relate to prevailing values of care delivery, brings the construction and consequences of 
markets back into the realm of composing public values. Rather than healthcare markets being 
an operationalization by policy actors of public values that are pre-defined in a political process, 
and rather than sticking to the promise that markets, under the right conditions and if properly 
organized, lead to allocative, productive and dynamic efficiency, a focus on the shaping of public 
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values in healthcare markets may show what markets are about and how they deal with other 
values than efficiency alone. Such an empirical focus on the shaping of market practices is utterly 
different from the politicized and polarized debate on ‘the market’ and the question on whether 
‘the’ market is suitable to ensure ‘the’ public values. It is exactly to the study of the composition 
of public values in healthcare markets that this paper will contribute. 
 In order to do so, we will first specify which research questions come to the fore when 
studying the making of markets for policy domains such as healthcare and its consequences for 
public values. In the light of these questions, we will analyze two empirical cases, being first, the 
construction of a market for hospital care in the Netherlands, based on a system of diagnose-
related groups (DBCs), and second, the development of a market for long term care based on 
care-load packages (ZZPs). These cases will allow us to conclude which values are built into these 
markets and how these markets are thereby empirically playing out in terms of the public values 
they were intended to ensure. This will also allow us to tentatively reconceive the relation 
between state, market and society in the light of these cases. 
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2 Studying Markets and Public Values in the Making 
If we cannot know exactly in advance what markets are and how public values are shaped in 
practice, the study of them becomes more processual and less polarized. It allows for an 
empirical study of healthcare markets that does not put State and Market in opposition to each 
other but, following Bruno Latour and Vincent Antonin Lépinay’s re-reading of Gabriel Tarde’s 
Psychologie Économique (Tarde 1902), opposes those “who believe in miracles of a pre-
established harmony and those who refuse to ‘believe in miracles’” (Latour and Lépinay 2009, p. 
5). Based on this refreshing opposition, the possible critique to prevailing market practices is not 
that economically inspired marketization violates the complexity of social practice by reducing it 
to quantified outcomes, such as often proposed by economic anthropology. This ‘counter science’ 
of economics thereby also risks embracing a ‘pre-established harmony’ and merely claims that 
economists have the wrong harmony in mind. Rather, the critique is that both economists and 
economic anthropologists may have a tendency to “not sufficiently quantify all of the values to 
which they have access” (ibid., p. 12, italics in the original) and to the way the market devices 
developed and public values pursued interact and shape each other. 
The market devices we study in this paper both have a strong financial component. This 
is not to say that they thereby are not about other public values like quality or accessibility; such 
instruments are exactly expected to ensure quality and access, as well as affordability in the 
policy aims. However, given our approach in this study, financial instruments would be expected 
to not merely instrumentally ensure the public value of quality but also to shape the notion of 
quality in very specific ways. The reasons for the preference of using market devices with a 
strong financial aspect is to some extent obvious since, as Tarde pointed out, they have one 
crucial advantage: “wealth is something much simpler and more easily measured; for it 
comprises infinite degrees and very few different types” (Tarde 1902, as cited in Latour and 
Lépinay 2009, p. 14). However, if all instruments are not merely instrumental means to achieve 
a pre-defined policy aim, but rather lead to the specific shaping of the aims, that is the public 
values, themselves (Latour 1999), our empirical focus should shift from the assumption that 
financial instruments can be introduced to ensure a broad range of public values, to the 
consequences these financial market devices have for public values and how financial 
instruments re-shape these values in practice. 
To analyze the process of the construction of public values in market practices, we will 
address three questions. First, what is the intended result of care markets according to various 
policy actors and market builders? They generally have a normative intent that is grounded in 
specific problems in healthcare settings. Failing to take this normative purpose of healthcare 
 10 
markets seriously, makes sociological enquiry susceptible to critique that fails to resonate with 
the issues at stake (Zuiderent-Jerak and Berg forthcoming 2010; Latour 2004). Second, what 
visible and invisible work has to be done by various actors to make markets work? One of the 
main gains of the social studies of markets and its grounding in science and technology studies, 
is that it brings in the symmetry principle (Bloor 1976), implying that the same kind of 
explanations should be used to explain success and failure of markets. A focus on the visible and 
invisible work (Star and Strauss 1999) of making markets does not privilege success over failure 
but analyses also how intended effects are achieved in practice. Such work is often left out of the 
analysis of how markets work, by jumping to their effects that are then quickly classified as 
‘normal’ effects of well-functioning markets on the one hand and ‘market failures’ on the other. 
Focusing on consequences rather than on effects also brings into the unit of analysis all that 
various actors need or fail to do to create these effects. Opening up the study of the interplay of 
markets and public values to this broader range of consequences thereby includes an analysis of 
who benefits and pays the price of making these markets work. Enabling the articulation of the 
issue of cui bono (Star 1991, pg. 43), brings us to our third question: what values are enacted in 
market practices in healthcare? This question allows us to address how the public values that 
these markets were supposed to ensure are actually shaped and at what possible cost or benefit 
and for whom. 
 Studying the intended results, the work needed to make markets work and the values that 
are produced in market practices in substantial empirical detail cannot be done overnight. The 
development, introduction and shaping of healthcare markets takes place over extended periods 
of time in which reconfiguration of organizations, market mechanisms, professionals and policy-
makers is ubiquitous. We therefore decided to focus our empirical analysis on two cases to which 
we already have an extensive and prolonged research relationship. We used a combined research 
strategy of revisiting data from previous years of research (2005-2008) in which we conducted 
extensive interviews, ethnographic observations and interventionist research in the 
organizations under study here. 
The study of the market for hospital care was connected to two years of interventionist 
research (Zuiderent-Jerak 2009) in a large teaching hospital in the Netherlands. During these 
two years, ethnographic research was carried out for one to two days a week in which one of the 
researchers (TZJ) was involved in the construction of care trajectories for oncology care and for 
elective surgery and orthopedics, that were supposed to bring together quality improvement and 
a strong position for the hospital. Returning to this hospital was the starting point of this case 
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study, and allowed us to draw upon existing knowledge about quality improvement 
developments in the light of the policy change, while also focusing on changes that had occurred 
in recent years. This study was extended with interviews with a specialized nurse, the innovation 
manager of the hospital, a medical specialist who also chairs one of the specialisms in the 
hospital and a division manager. Following these interviews in the hospital, we conducted 
interviews with a purchaser of the largest insurer in the area of this hospital. Further, we 
interviewed the development manager and an economic expert at the Dutch Healthcare 
Authority and the responsible expert at the Dutch Association of Insurers responsible for 
developing the DBC-purchasing guide (see below). 
The study of the market for long term care was linked to a former research of six long-
term care institutions: two mental care institutes, two for mentally disabled people, and two 
nursing homes (Grit and De Bont 2007). At that time data were collected through semi-
structured, in-depth interviews (n=29) and focus groups (n=2) with executives, managers, 
professionals and client representatives. In these interviews we focused on new developments 
such as market-like financing, commercial initiatives and demand-oriented care. Contrary to our 
initial expectations, the interviews gave the impression that the effects of the developing health 
care market are found only on the shop floor. In the former research, organizations were on the 
eve of the introduction of care packages and, some of them, commercial activities. We returned 
to two of our former case organizations to research if their former ideas have already crystallized 
out. In the organization for disabled people, we interviewed the project manager care packages 
(ZZP), one cluster manager, two location managers, one senior advisor finance and one staff 
member marketing. We focused here on how the organization has dealt with the new market 
device of care packages or individual-trailing funding (see below). In the organization for elderly 
care, we interviewed the executive, the cure manager and one care adviser. This organization has 
had serious ambitions to start with commercial activities and we wanted to know if they were 
implemented and what the relation is between care packages and commercial activities. 
All interviews were transcribed verbatim and analyzed to further explore the 
consequences of market mechanisms that were introduced some years ago and to see how the 
market devices have further developed since then. It is this combination of data sources over a 
longer period of time that allows us to address the issues raised above. As is generally the case in 
ethnographic studies and other forms of qualitative research, representativeness is not the aim of 
the study (Cresswell 2003). Rather, this research focuses on a specific case which it analyses in 
depth to produce precise findings that may function like a ‘golden event’ (Jensen 2009) in the 
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sense that they are able to produce, through their specificity, interesting insights into practices 
that would not be captured by more general analyses of larger numbers of cases (Weiss 1977). 
 In the case of the hospital market the selection was based on a the fact that we had a 
long-established research relationship to this hospital, which would be helpful in getting access, 
but that relationship itself was not a mere coincidence. This hospital participated in government-
initiated quality improvement programs. Furthermore, in the most recent annual overview of 
quality in hospitals that is produced on the basis of performance-indicators that hospitals hand 
in to the Dutch Healthcare Inspectorate, this hospital was ranked first. Repeated studies have 
shown that these rankings are problematic and cannot be taken face-value (Pollit et al. 2010; 
Pons, Lingsma, and Bal 2009), but it does indicate that this is a hospital that is committed to 
quality and thereby provides an interesting site for studying the interaction between market 
practices and public values. The relevance of this case if further strengthened by the fact that the 
largest insurer in the region has a reputation among policy makers to be quite committed to 
quality as well, which was even seen as a risk in one of the interviews as this could prove to be a 
bias in terms of this case showing relatively positive relations between market practices that 
ensure public values. This potential bias is however seen as an advantage in this study as it 
allows us to analyze how markets and public values interact under rather favourable conditions, 
which increases the pertinence of any problems we may encounter here and also indicates some 
of the conditions under which public values might be seen to synergize. 
 In the case of the long term care market, we selected two organizations that were front 
runners in the debate about the introduction of market elements in healthcare. Even though they 
were not explicitly pro-market, they have tried to react pro-actively on the developments. Their 
critical stance towards market mechanisms, however without a complete rejection of them, can 
also be seen as an advantage in this study as it allows us to analyze how organizations shape and 
defend public values after the introduction of a new market device (ZZP) in the long term care 
sector. These organizations that were neither ‘pro-market’ nor ‘anti-market’ give us an 
impression of the interrelations between market practices and public values. 
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3 Diagnose-Related Groups and Markets for Hospital Care 
3.1 What is the intended result? 
Since the 1970’s, public expenses in healthcare have been on the rise and already since the late 
1980’s, the introduction of market mechanisms was proposed as a possible solution to turn the 
tables on increasing costs (van Egmond and Zuiderent-Jerak submitted). Though attempts at the 
time and over the following decades were initially unsuccessful, continuous efforts by policy 
makers to develop infrastructures like risk adjustment systems for healthcare insurance 
companies, prepared the ground for changes in the governance of hospital care that were based 
on market mechanisms (Helderman et al. 2005). The notion that the healthcare consumer 
should have buying or co-paying power and thereby steer quality (Berg, de Brantes, and 
Schellekens 2006) has been heavily critiqued for being practically unworkable and theoretically 
flawed (Jost 2007); Dutch policy makers chose not to put this notion centre stage in the 
construction of the Dutch hospital market. Rather, according to the 2006 Healthcare Insurance 
Act, the construction of the Dutch market for hospital care assumed that insurance companies 
act as proxies for individual citizens who can buy good quality care at a reasonable cost on behalf 
of citizens. This of course seems a perfect example of the delegation to private parties for 
assuring public values, as proposed by policy-scientists. However, the process of delegation does 
not stop here, as assuring public values is actually partially delegated one step further. As 
healthcare insurance companies are not automatically expected to only want what is best for 
their clients, citizens are positioned as a countervailing power (Light 2000) by being given the 
option to choose their insurer. Insurance companies have to accept citizens as their customers 
and health insurance is compulsory to all citizens to avoid ‘free-riders’ of the system. As not all 
citizens have equal health risks, the above mentioned risk-adjustment model compensates 
insurers for inequalities in health risks in their populations. Furthermore, there is a nationally 
defined basic package that specifies the care that all insurers must provide and that leaves other 
forms of care to be insured via optional additional insurance schemes. This differentiation of 
basic and non-basic care is proposed by the Dutch Healthcare Insurance Board and approved by 
government. 
 Within this regulatory arrangement, the role of the insurance companies is to negotiate 
with care providers about the quality and cost of the care they wish to deliver. Such negotiations 
would ideally lead to selective contracts, in which insurance companies would only contract 
those care providers who provide the best quality at the lowest cost, thereby providing an 
incentive for other care providers to raise their bar in terms of quality and do so in an efficient 
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way. Insurance companies are expected to have ‘buying power’ as they represent a large number 
of citizens and thereby many potential clients for hospitals. They are also expected to apply this 
power to stimulate quality improvement and cost reductions. 
 To commodify particular treatments, prior to 2005, diagnose-treatment combinations 
(DBCs), a version of diagnose-related groups, have been developed so that the negotiations 
between insurers and hospitals did not need to be based on individual interventions, but on such 
DBCs that apply to a series of events and are more closely related to trajectories of care delivery. 
The Dutch ministry of Health decided that the DBCs would be divided into two groups: an A-
segment, of which the prices would be fixed on a national level and that are priced based on a 
budgetary logic, and a B-segment, for which prices could be freely negotiated between insurers 
and hospitals. Though both segments could in principle lead to negotiations between insurers 
and hospitals, leaving out price turns the A-segment into an unusual market, where negotiations 
would mainly have to focus on quality and volume. It is therefore that this segment is usually not 
referred to as a healthcare market, whereas the B-segment is. Discussions on marketization as 
the one that opened this chapter, focus on the extension of the B-segment, thereby equalizing 
‘markets’ with ‘money’, which was exactly what Latour and Lépinay critiqued. So for our 
analysis, we do not wish to follow this distinction between B-segment as ‘market’ and A-segment 
as ‘nonmarket’, as this assumes an a priori notion of ‘the market’ that privileges financial 
considerations over other ones. However, we will see that the fact that many actors follow the 
definition of the market as a financial instrument and thereby do not pursue possibilities for 
negotiation in the A-segment, is highly consequential and de facto turns this segment into an 
‘almost-nonmarket’. Which brings us to our next question: how and why does this market work? 
 
3.2 What makes markets work? 
3.2.1 Care providers at work 
In the wake of the market arrangements that were being developed, the Dutch ministry of Health 
started a large scale improvement program, called ‘Better Faster’ which would “prepare the 
hospital sector for the new care system” (Ministry of Health Welfare and Sport 2005). Within 
this program, hospitals were supported to improve their patient safety and logistics through a 
series of national breakthrough collaboratives and other quality improvement programs. 
Hospitals started to analyze their care processes in terms of waiting time, throughput time, 
length of stay, number of interventions in the process and number of visits to the outpatient 
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clinic. As a result, the hospitals analyzed how their care processes could be organized differently 
and how quality improvement could lead to gains not only in terms of organizational efficiency 
and patient experience but also in terms of the profits that a hospital made on care trajectories 
or, to put it more euphemistically, what the cost of poor quality was. For this, improvement 
teams in hospitals developed business cases in which they compared present with desired 
trajectories and could calculate the financial implications of their quality improvement efforts. 
 However, these business cases assumed that financial departments of hospitals knew the 
cost of individual interventions, outpatient clinic visits and the cost of staff. This was not the 
case. For most hospitals it was a huge task to produce the costing data and they tended to 
prioritize calculating costs for interventions in the B-segment over costs that were only relevant 
in the A-segment. However, once available and integrated in these business cases, they sparked 
interesting discussions between hospital management, doctors and quality managers. In many 
cases quality improvement and cost reduction seemed quite probable by reducing length of stay 
through better pain management or by omitting redundant interventions that were the result of 
poor coordination between professionals (Pronk 2006; Zuiderent-Jerak 2009). In other cases 
care processes could be organized as day-case surgery, but this would lead to a reduction in 
income compared to admitting a patient for one night, for which another DBC could be used. In 
such cases there suddenly seemed to be very good medical reasons to not take any risk and admit 
patients for one night anyway. 
 Improving care processes and assessing financial consequences were not the only tasks 
hospitals had to carry out. In addition to this work, they also needed to develop dashboards for 
internal steering, to ensure that, once a care product had been sold at a low price, it would also 
be produced accordingly, rather than falling back to the previous situation in which the hospital 
could face a financial loss. Overviews of for example the number of hospital visits between 
colonoscopy and surgery were readily available and were contrasted with the norm for such care 
set by the improvement team for this care trajectory (see figure 1). 
Even if this was all achieved, a substantial challenge that the hospitals had to face was to 
interest care insurers for quality improvement. This turned out to be much and difficult work 
with insurers who did not always display the expected interest in quality during negotiations. As 
the quality manager of the hospital put it: 
We have to take the initiative to bring everything related to quality to the table, but during 
negotiations they are hardly interested. But at the end of the day they do return with 
indicators or with the Consumer Quality index, or with other monsters. 
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Figure 1: dashboards for steering quality. 
Since insurers did not seem to have an a priori quality focus, the hospital went at length to 
position quality as a relevant issue, and tried to sell their quality achievements. This at times 
results in rather archetypical forms of commodification: 
We have to put it on the agenda. It is also not being asked: you have to offer it. On certain 
domains, these are increasing, where we realize: well, here we have a bit extra, a discerning 
product, we do put up an enormous show – always improvised; it is not very structured – but 
quite a show, just to make it visible for the insurer. Part of that show is the production of 
brochures about what that care looks like. We have those for obstetrics, gynaecology, 
paediatrics, in these departments we have nice brochures with graphs, protocols and other 
characteristics for the various target-groups within the insurance company. So we can show: 
here you are: this is what our care looks like. That is all part of our repertoire. 
TZJ: And that is also clear to the insurer, that those brochures have been produced 
especially for them? 
Yes, absolutely. You couldn’t hand that out to anybody else. No patient would think ‘this is 
about me’. So it’s being explicitly offered and discussed [with the insurer]. Well, another 
string to our bow is of course that we always need to have the professional himself join the 
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discussion. So we have gynaecologists talk till the last injection after delivery, about why that 
is required. At that moment we have two gynaecologists explaining the medical advisor [of 
the insurance company] why that injection at that moment really should be included in this 
DBC. Our experience is that specialists tend to convince medical advisers. But perhaps that 
model has already lost its strength, because we see the gynaecologists have to hand these 
things in again. 
Despite the work by the hospital organization of producing sales brochures and by doctors sitting 
in on negotiations to personally specify quality, it remains hard to ‘sell’ quality in the terms that 
medical professionals would like to. In the debate on healthcare markets the fact that 
negotiations sometimes are more focused on financial aspects than on medical quality, is often 
explained through the existence of ‘information asymmetry’. If information about quality is not 
readily available to all parties, the negotiations will focus on the information that is available, 
and that tends to be of a financial nature as, as we have seen above, financial measures comprise 
infinite degrees and very few different types. In response to this problem, many actors try to 
define quality in quality indicators with an equal simplicity and transportability that can then be 
brought into the assessment. As the purchaser of a large insurance company put it: 
And what kind of quality-indicators we could agree upon. This is something we focused on 
immediately in 2005: we went for that quality. And we have invested a lot, especially during 
the first years, to uncover what care is actually being delivered. And that was the input, when 
we were having our price-negotiations, to put that next to those. 
However, where the notion of information asymmetry would suppose that once these 
transportable performance-indicators are available, they would be taken into account when 
quality and price are being negotiated. The problem in our case however seems to be that even 
when such quality information has been produced, and is readily available at the negotiation 
table, this only becomes part of the equation in very particular cases. And those tend to be the 
cases where cost is an important factor again. As the purchaser put it: 
One indicator could be, if you want to be a preferred provider, than your price would have to 
be below average. But that doesn’t mean that as soon as someone else is ten Euro’s cheaper, 
they get moved to poll position. (…) We do assume that quality and affordable care could go 
together. Which means that as soon as you [as a hospital] do something right and it becomes 
more expensive, we are less interested than the other way around. 
Though beyond the scope of this study, it would be interesting to do an analysis of the hospitals 
that are in fact assigned as preferred partners, but still this interpretation of quality explains 
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partly why it is so hard for hospitals to bring quality into the equation of negotiations because, 
even when it is readily available, quality largely becomes relevant only when it also saves costs. If 
quality would always come at a lower cost, there would be no tension here but in that case 
healthcare could do with quite simple and technocratic – that is; purely calculative – 
arrangements for measuring best quality at lowest costs. As this was the initial assumption for 
many players in the market for hospital care, this market in this hospital ironically worked better 
in terms of negotiating for quality and price in the early years based on rather poor information 
(Zuiderent-Jerak 2009) than it seems to be working now, after a longer period of sometimes 
frustrating experiences, but based on better information on quality and cost. The dashboards on 
quality and cost parameters per care trajectory that were only managerial dreams in 2007, had 
actually materialized in 2010 and yet it proved harder to bring quality and cost together in some 
cases in annual negotiations. This on the one hand is an important finding that problematizes 
the notion of information asymmetry and brings to the fore the importance of belief to make 
policy instruments work. On the other hand it shows the importance of sustained analysis of how 
markets work over time as beliefs may change due to multifarious reasons, which may have 
dramatic consequences for how able market practices are to ensure public values. One of the 
reasons this belief may have changed over time is that it proves extremely hard for insurers to 
sell the quality they would purchase at a higher cost, at a higher price to their insured. We return 
to this issue below, but for now this situation puts centre stage the question what is to be done 
with better care that may come at a higher cost with an insurer who defines quality as implying 
cost reduction? 
According to the respondents of the Dutch Healthcare Authority, there are three types of 
innovation, which will relate differently to the present regulatory arrangements: 
There are different forms of innovation; when it gets cheaper at the same quality, then of 
course all is fine. If it costs more and increases quality, then you have to pay for more quality, 
that has to be expressed in the price – or not, but then you have insufficient supply. And 
thirdly we have breakthrough technologies, which may need to be subsidized. 
So for the actors involved especially the second form of innovation is problematic. There 
seem to be two possible strategies here, which the hospital both pursues: creative bookkeeping 
(in the not necessarily euphemistic sense of the term) and playing the patient card. Creative 
bookkeeping has of course become associated with scandals, greed and the misappropriation of 
funds. Leaving such normative judgments aside, hospitals at present have more literal strategies 
of creative bookkeeping, in the sense of being creative to make sure that the costs they incur for 
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delivering additional quality are actually born by insurance companies. Such creativity 
sometimes leads to adding up certain items to then be able to charge a different fee. As a division 
manager explained: 
Patients with oesophagus carcinoma get a PET-CT scan and after assessing that and in case it 
is required, also an endo-echo on the same day. Because of their illness they are quite frail 
and we admit them for day-case treatment so that they get enough rest in between these two 
large, heavy diagnostic tests and can recover. This is all the more important, given the 
relatively long distance many patients have to travel because of our regional specialization. 
This way we reduce the number of hospital visits and we create a way to somewhat cover our 
additional costs. 
Where this creativity with booking DBCs was one strategy, this is not an approach that 
generally gains most societal acceptance and in health economists literature it is referred to as 
‘upcoding’ (Steinbusch et al. 2007). Upcoding, being defined as “the practice of miscoding and 
misclassifying patient data to receive higher reimbursements for services provided” (Lorence 
and Richards 2002, pg. 423) may be a pragmatic solution and highly understandable given the 
presented complexity of financial streams, but by some health economists, this is rather seen as 
an “hospital acquired disease” (Simborg 1981). One of the main problems with the practice of 
upcoding is that there is no countervailing power that prevents that creative bookkeeping from 
turning into simple money grappling. It may be a way of making ends meet for a hospital that is 
inefficiently organized, and thereby not contribute to the public value of affordability of care. 
One possible alternative route that does not involve upcoding would therefore be to play 
the patient card. Within the model of the Dutch hospital care market, the countervailing power 
would be individual patients who are expected to vote with their feet and change insurer if they 
are not satisfied with the way the insurance company, as a third party, is ensuring their interests 
(Schut 2009, p. 70). This would encourage the hospital to target patients and their 
representatives more directly in order to ensure that insurance companies may be willing to 
broaden up their definition of quality. This is exactly what this hospital does. Besides the extra 
work that the hospital and care professionals have to carry out to articulate quality at this 
negotiating table, this hospital does not focus all its attention on the insurers. To frame the 
importance of quality improvement that is so hard to sell to the proxy purchaser of hospital care, 
this hospital has also chosen to address citizens and other relevant parties via other routes by 
signing a ‘contract with society’, including highly specific care agreements per diagnosis that are 
announced in local newspapers and the quality journal of the hospital. 
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That started with our anniversary in 2004. That was our first contract with society: that’s 
where it started. Because we used the anniversary year of 100 years Atrium to spent many 
Saturday mornings in our auditorium with many patient groups, talking about: what do we 
want from each other, and the care guarantees [that were introduced at a later stage] are 
actually a specification of what commenced there. And by now it is an annual adjustment of 
the contract with society and it got this specific: What do we deliver to our patients with 
Parkinson? What can he count on? When is it not good enough? And what penalty card will 
you hand in where? With a management-system behind it on our side: do we still deliver what 
we agreed to? 
However, there are two problems with this strategy: first, as we will see below, this strategy 
assumes that insurers are able to sell better quality at a higher cost to individual clients, which 
requires a trust in insurers that is presently absent, and second, the individual patient nor the 
insurance company at the end of the day really seem to define where patients go. Referral of 
patients is organized in the Netherlands by the gate-keeping position of general practitioners 
(GPs). These may refer to specific hospitals or even doctors and thereby to a large extent define 
where patients go. They can do so on the basis of long-term relationships with hospitals and, 
given the fact that they at present are among the few actors that see patients go to the hospitals 
they refer them to and return with their stories of what happened, while also to some extent 
having insight into the medical outcomes produced, this may well make them crucial actors for 
qualifying public values in their referrals (Dixon et al. 2010). However, their central role also at 
times produces problems for the hospital, insurers and patients and became painfully clear 
during an incident between the hospital and GPs. The hospital at one point in time was quite 
surprised that the stream of patients for their well-organized oncological trajectories, all of a 
sudden seemed to vanish almost entirely into thin air. They soon found out that this had 
everything to do with a problem that was not even closely related to these care trajectories but 
had to do with a conflict that had emerged between the hospital and the local GPs. The hospital 
had developed a diagnostic centre that GPs had to refer to from now on. This centre was 
separated from the hospital and placed at some organizational and geographic distance. 
However, the president of the local GP association had been involved in the set up of the 
previous diagnostic centre that used to be based inside the hospital and he was not amused, as 
he found the previous situation much more suitable and workable. And to show his dismay with 
the situation that emerged between these two organizations he urged his colleagues to not 
merely take legal action and sue the hospital, but also to follow some guerrilla tactics: he 
proposed that they would not refer patients to the hospital any more until the issue was resolved. 
As the quality manager of the hospital explained: 
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The relationship got tense all of a sudden and well, this has been played in all kinds of 
understandable and incomprehensible ways, which resulted in an increasing number of 
referral-streams that passed us by. Also to put the pressure on us and show that we no longer 
were friends and how powerful they are. And sometimes Sittard could have an access time for 
endoscopies that just beat ours and that then became the only target [for GPs]. The fact that 
the whole trajectory after that was not organized and that after being diagnosed – your worst 
nightmare – you’re put on hold for several months because they didn’t have our care program 
over there, that all of a sudden didn’t matter [to the GPs]. (…) They didn’t give access to 
patients to the things we had organized really well here. 
The quality manager admitted that the hospital possibly made mistakes but that is beside the 
point here. More importantly, this event shows how fragile the notion of the individual patient as 
a countervailing power is and how this may at once be a highly coercive force and a force that is 
not necessarily linked to the expected role of standing up for quality (Silverman 1987; Zuiderent-
Jerak, Bal, and Berg forthcoming). At present the hospital is distributing their attention even 
more for of course they cannot shift it away from insurers and society, as these are not 
unimportant, but they, as well as insurers, do need to include GPs in their communication about 
delivered care but especially maintain good relations with them as patient streams may become 
the plaything in other political struggles. 
 
3.2.2 Insurers at work 
When analyzing the work that hospitals need to do to make the market work and try to overcome 
what they perceive as its problems, we already met the insurance companies, and they turned 
out to at times pose difficulties to hospitals. But the dynamics are a bit more reciprocal than just 
that. Insurance companies have since the introduction of the Healthcare Insurance Act in 2006 
been positioned in such a way that they are the main negotiating party for hospitals and, with the 
Healthcare Inspectorate mainly ensuring minimum quality, that they have a core role to play in 
ensuring public values in hospital care. This is no small task, given that they – in principle – 
could negotiate on a large number of DBCs. This would require enormous capacity of staff and 
detailed knowledge on every bit of care delivered within hospitals – a daunting task that 
obviously is unfeasible for insurers. So one of their core activities in making sure they can at least 
negotiate on some trajectories rather than get lost in the entire bulk is to minimize the DBCs they 
are negotiating. As a purchaser of a large insurance company put it: 
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We cannot review all DBCs till behind the comma. So we made a list with spearheads that 
have mainly been based on revenue and volume, so let’s say a top 20 or a top 15. And we also 
looked at what we find important topics, like breast cancer and diabetes. So those aspects 
were also taken into account. These actually are also large volumes, so that was a good match. 
So the idea that insurance companies negotiate in the name of their patients needs to be 
substantially nuanced to understand how insurance companies reduce their tasks to a doable 
scale. If insurance companies were delegated the task to ensure public values the question 
thereby of course becomes: what about the other DBCs? For those in the B-segment 
Zorgverzekeraars Nederland (ZN), the sector organization representing the providers of care 
insurance in the Netherlands publishes an annual DBC purchasing guide (figure 2) with the 
subtitle Quality as a compass when purchasing care. 
       
Figure 2: DBC purchasing guide 2009 
They do so together with a number of actors. In the process of constructing this commercially 
available “guideline for the negotiations between healthcare insurers and providers of secondary 
care” (http://www.bsl.nl/shop/dbcinkoopgids-­‐2009-­‐segment-­‐2-­‐9789031360925.html), the 
sector organization cooperates with scientific medical associations, structuring their cooperation 
around the use of clinical practice guidelines. Furthermore, performance-indicators that are 
developed on a national level are directly integrated and the opinion of patient associations is 
included for a number of diseases. This guide was developed as an immediate response to the 
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new role insurers had to play when they were to negotiate with hospitals on the content and price 
of care. As the respondent of the Dutch Association of Insurers stated: 
That’s the history of the purchasing guide, that when the [previous minister of Health] 
Bomhof said: “you go and negotiate about this now”, so insurers had to negotiate about say 
cataract. But what is that actually? Because what is good care? And do we have an indicator 
for that? That has been the trigger to start discussing this, so that is why the first purchasing 
guide was developed for the B-segment, because then you have to negotiate for a product that 
doesn’t come with a price. So you have to know: what is that product actually? What does it 
look like? 
This purchasing guide frames to a large extent what the negotiations that are taking place should 
be about and what would be a good standard for care that is not being negotiated. As the 
purchaser explained: 
Initially we produce an aid for the purchasers, based on ZN care profiles, that have been 
developed in the knowledge centre of ZN with their medical advisors and professional 
associations. You shouldn’t quite call it a norm-profile. It’s an aid for purchasers. 
TZJ: You mean the purchasing guide? 
Yes, the purchasing guide. So that is an important tool for us and based on that we ask, we 
call that ‘clever questions’ but perhaps they are stupid questions, but we hope for clever 
answers. We ask those to hospitals. We do so in writing and then we initially have a quality 
meeting, as we call that, and there we discuss the care profiles. And then we also request the 
care profiles [of the hospital], at least of our spearheads. And based on those profiles they 
give us, together with our medical advisor, we combine their profiles with the ZN profiles or 
with our own CZ profiles and based on that we start to ask questions or we have a meeting. 
Then we see if based on those profiles they deliver the care we would actually want and if not, 
why not. 
This DBC purchasing guide is a rather interesting market device for a number of reasons. First, it 
seems indispensable in reducing the enormous work for healthcare insurance companies to 
doable proportions. Second, though this framing is crucial for a pragmatically working hospital 
care market, the idea that public values were delegated to insurance companies, who act on 
behalf of their insured customer/citizen-hybrids, seems in need of respecification. The hot 
potato largely seems to have ended up on the plate of ZN with its hybrid forum of doctors, 
patients and guidelines. This raises questions about the form and place where public values are 
in fact being shaped and what is brought into this de facto national framing of the quality of care. 
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 For those DBCs that do fall within the negotiation scope of the insurance companies, they 
need not rely solely on the profile in the DBC purchasing guide or the sweet-talk of medical 
specialists. They also have their own DBC profiles and are supported in their negotiations by 
medical advisors that they employ. And though these advisors have to deal with a selection of 
DBCs, the range of topics is still quite broad. 
We have medical advisors and these are linked to a hospital and we tend to bring those to the 
meeting. They are more general advisors, so not really specialized in cardiology or another 
specialism. Within our medical advisory group there are of course some specialists, people 
who specialized or have a specific interest in certain disciplines. So in this way we build up 
expertise in this matter. 
So though the insurers try to develop specific expertise on the main care trajectories, it is of 
course hard to match the detailed expertise of care professionals who are sitting at the same 
negotiation table to discuss the kinds of details outlined above. As for them, in their definition of 
quality, the devil is in the details, this is bound to lead to a substantial discrepancy in how care 
can be discussed at the negotiation table. As one of the medical specialists phrased it: 
It is not surprising if you look at the medical advisor, what their background is and what an 
incredibly wide range she has to cover, that it is simply not doable to cover the entire range of 
specialized medical care. They don’t get further than the map with profiles of ZN: the 
purchasing guide and that’s it. And of course that’s pretty marginal, because it’s not hard to 
exceed that. Especially since the purchasing guide is not necessarily attuned with the most 
recent guidelines and developments in medical research. 
This may indicate even further the importance of the purchasing guide, as it already may be 
hardly doable for insurance companies to bring the expertise to the table to really be able to 
ascertain public values in care negotiations. But before drawing this conclusion the framing of 
this guide would need some further scrutiny. 
 One of the ways in which the purchasing guide deals with the rather overwhelming 
number of DBCs that could in principle be negotiated, is to cluster them. As the respondent of 
ZN explained: 
Let’s take a simple example: cataract. There are now 3 DBCs: one in outpatient clinics, one as 
day-case surgery and one with admission. You can say, all right, you can assign three prices to 
that, or you can say – and that always has been our primary aim – all well and good: we turn 
this into one basket: we make a combined profile. So we reduce these three to one. There are 
three different codes, but as far as we’re concerned, you can put one price to this and that will 
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be a mix of these three. From outpatient, day-case and admission. That is one way in which 
we made it doable. 
Besides clustering, another way of creating doability of negotiations on large numbers of DBCs is 
to specify which one can be excluded from negotiations. As the ZN respondent again explains: 
Everywhere where it reads ‘no’ we said: we don’t make a profile for that. This actually means 
two things. Either it is nonsense: this DBC should actually not even be listed. So this means: 
price zero. Or it is so rare: we’re not going to negotiate about that, you give your price and I’ll 
see if I think: ‘ouch, let go of my arm’. (…) So in that way we’ve approached it. So we looked 
at: how many DBCs are there in the B-segment – something like 10.000 or so, and we have 
been able to reduce these to let’s say 200. And then our focus has always been on high-
volume DBCs. 
In an interesting quest for doability, DBCs thereby are increasingly combined and selected. What 
this of course introduces is a notion of representativeness of certain DBCs for the quality of care 
in more general terms. A relatively small number of ‘baskets’ covers a large percentage of care 
delivered, especially in certain types of care like eye-care. The assumption of the purchasing 
guide thereby becomes that a small number of DBCs can be used to negotiate, while still 
pursuing quality on a larger scale: 
At some point I can start to discuss eye-care. Because someone who’s very good in cataract 
procedures, why would that person not also be very good in glaucoma procedures? (…) So 
then we’re talking about eye-care, if I know that these are some core points, of which I can 
say, well, if that is well organized, then the rest will follow along. 
This assumption is highly understandable in the light of the creation of a doable healthcare 
market, but raises questions based on the observation of quality improvement researchers that 
improvement of one stream of care often is at the expense of other patient groups. This 
phenomenon, generally referred to as ‘carve out’ (Silvester et al. 2004), has been particularly 
noted in eye-care where the dominance of cataract often leads to well-organized ‘streets’ that are 
completely decoupled from other forms of eye-care. Yet, even negotiating on all 200 DBCs would 
simply not be doable for insurance companies, given the capacity this would require, or would at 
least come at a huge burden and potential cost. 
 A further specificity of the negotiations taking place is that where the insurer is expected 
to have a certain ‘buying power’ this is not always the case. Where sometimes the hospitals voice 
their concerns about the force with which insurers push them to the lowest price for a DBC, there 
are other occasions where the insurer has to settle for whatever price it is offered because it 
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simply is uninteresting for the hospital to negotiate with an insurer that only has a few patients a 
year in that care trajectory. 
We have hospitals where we are market-leader, we have hospitals where we have a 
substantial market-share in the B-segment and we have remaining hospitals where we have a 
minor market-share. That is divided in about 35 in the first category, so where we are market-
leader. In the second category there are about 11 and that leaves about 55 in the last category. 
And that last category, there we discuss quality to a much lesser extent. There we basically ask 
for a quote. An then we do it the other way around; we look at the prices and where we see 
strange prices, and in principle there where we have spearheads, we ask for a clarification: 
“how come you are so much more expensive?” So then we reverse it. 
But what we also face; these [hospitals] are more of a nuisance. Last year during the 
negotiations we told one hospital “listen, your price is way too high”. Then they say “yea, so 
what?!”. “Well, then we don’t contract you”, and then they say “well, how do you see that”, 
they say, “because then we’ll put a notice-board in the corridor that says: caution; if you are 
insured with CZ, you will probably have to pay yourself. Around the corner here you find an 
Achmea boot where you can change insurer to Achmea.” That is the kind of threat we then 
face. Not that we are sensitive to that. 
 We already indicated that hospitals have to keep their eye at least as much on GPs as on 
insurers if they want to know where patient streams are going. However, insurers do have 
services for ‘care negotiation’ to help their clients reach the right care professional.  
We act as care intermediary and that also is an important aspect, but you shouldn’t 
overestimate that in terms of volume. 
TZJ: How big a percentage of your patient population are we talking about here? 
I think that at most 5% [turns to us]. So… And often that is because they have to wait too 
long, but also quite often just because they want to receive good care. We have quite a good 
network for that and a feeling for what hospitals deliver. Of course there are signals, like: this 
hospital over here is really better than the other one. But to be able to objectify this reliably, 
we are working on that to map that more clearly. 
So though this insurer is trying to develop expertise and become a more central player in 
referring patients, they do realize that they are still far from becoming a central player in steering 
patient streams (Boonen 2009) – which, given their definition of quality (that comes at a lower 
cost) is perhaps unsurprising. As the purchaser phrased it: 
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We still have quite some work to do to improve our image. We are still not perceived as an 
insurer who is knowledgeable when it comes to quality, that knows where to find the best 
care. We are also suspicious, because if we recommend something it will probably be 
something cheap rather than something good. 
This image is the problem that insurers want to work on and selectively contracting certain 
hospitals may produce exactly the opposite result. As a respondent of the Dutch Healthcare 
Authority explained: 
I think there is a not that credible threat that insurers will not give hospitals a contract. That 
has to do with the fact that, in case an insurers plays hardball during negotiations, then they 
risk not having a contract. They then need to explain this to their insured, meaning: you will 
no longer go to that hospital, or you have to contribute a substantial amount. This leads to 
reputational damage, and that contradicts the purchase profit. 
Ironically, the infrastructures for negotiating may at times be more consequential and less 
problem-ridden than the actual negotiations themselves. This became clear when the respondent 
of ZN told us about the unexpected use of the purchasing guide that is not only an instrument for 
insurers, but also for hospital directors: 
The board of directors of the [one of the large hospitals in the West of the country], they took 
this guide and went to their doctors, saying: “well, look here?!” Within one week the length of 
stay was down by two days. (…) They have something on paper that isn’t theirs but has a 
certain degree of objectivity, because ‘we [as hospital directors] also didn’t make this up’. The 
professional organizations have indicated: this is how we think it should look on average. This 
is what they took to the specialists, saying: “well, you seem to deviate from this norm. You 
can, but than I’d also like to know why that is the case.” Apparently there was no valid reason, 
so in that sense it has produced results: wonderful! 
In this sense the purchasing guide is setting a de facto norm, without being designed to formally 
function as a national norm. But apparently, the threat of a future negotiation combined with a 
standard set partly by doctors themselves, can produce quality gains without needing the actual 
negotiation. 
As we have shown in this paragraph, where the hospital already had to do much work to 
shape public values in the market for hospital care, the challenge for insurers to make the market 
work through all kinds of visible and invisible work seems no less daunting and the results for 
themselves and for the relation between markets and public values no less ambiguous. Having 
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analyzed some of the work various actors carry out in the market for hospital care, we now 
return to the question what the values are that are produced. 
 
3.3 Values in this market 
One aspect of public values in this healthcare market that has come to the fore quite explicitly is 
that public values tend to get framed in particular ways in the light of financial market devices. 
Quality is being improved through these devices, but mainly the quality that comes at a lower 
cost. Interestingly, all actors, whether based in hospitals, insurance companies or agencies like 
ZN, grant an ontologically privileged status to the price-mechanism to ensure public values. For 
those aspects of care that are not part of the DBC B-segment a purchasing guide is absent, 
insurers indicate that quality is only quality if it includes efficiency gains and hospitals point out 
that quality does not come with a financial advantage cannot be sold – neither in the A, nor in 
the B-segment. In the case studied here, attempts to improve quality of care that does not fit the 
insurers’ definition leads to strong debates between hospital management and care 
professionals, with professionals at times pursuing quality improvement and regional 
specialization that proves a management puzzle in a hospital that is committed to quality 
improvement but also has a business to run. This was for example the case with oesophagus 
carcinoma in this hospital. There had been a strong impulse on a national level to centralize the 
treatment of this form of cancer in a smaller number of hospitals, or at least have a selected 
number of surgeons carry out the operations. Clinical evidence has shown that the mortality of 
patients has a direct inverse relation to the number of operations carried out by surgeons 
(Birkmeyer et al. 2003). The Dutch Healthcare Inspectorate has turned this finding into a 
performance-indicator, setting as a minimum norm that a surgeon has to carry out this 
operation at least 10 times a year. The professionals in this hospital had taken up this challenge 
and had informed their colleagues in the region that they were specializing in this type of 
surgery, would organize a smooth running care trajectory for them, as they had done for other 
trajectories, and agreed that their colleagues would refer these patients to them. These surgeons 
thereby did exactly what any quality-committed healthcare inspector could have hoped for and 
they could literally be expected to be saving lives through this improvement. However, their 
strategy seemed to be perfectly opposed to the emerging management strategy to deal with the 
present market arrangements. As the quality manager explained: 
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There is one promising strategy: reducing the products you loose money on. And this is what 
just about everyone on the market is doing. So we all do that, perhaps we are the last ones to 
find out, because it so much goes against our nature: we see surgeons cheerfully bringing in 
their next spearhead, regional function, we’re probably already one of the largest centres in 
the country [for oesophagus carcinoma], hooray. We’ve had no OR mortality since we picked 
this up two years ago and we didn’t start any procedures where, because of progression or 
metastasis we couldn’t do anything, which indicates careful diagnostics. Well, if that is the 
measure, then they’re doing a fantastic job over there: in fact this makes all of us in the 
Atrium really happy. There now however is a dominant development, in which the 
[managerial] divisions certainly play a role. Bleeders and feeders: what is draining us and 
how do we stop the bleeding. Besides zip codes there is a range of different options. Already 
now the next bleeder will not get in. So the next issue like oesophagus will be obstructed by 
many people here in the hospital, before some enthused professional says: “I can do this! I 
can do that! So we have a good ICU and at the ward I also will get it together, we can do this 
together! Can I do it?” “No way!”, that is what we’ll say. We’re already saying that. 
On the one hand this is a typical problem of the budget-driven system where prices are set at a 
national level, without differentiating for quality. However, because of the looming expansion of 
the B-segment, there is some reluctance to make any changes in the specification of the A-
segment DBCs. So within the present arrangement where the maintenance of DBCs is no longer 
carried out for the A-segment, quality that comes at a higher cost can simply not be sold, even 
though such quality might perfectly fit the definition of the Dutch Healthcare Inspectorate and 
be praised in the international quality improvement literature. 
 If this situation would only apply to the A-segment, this could easily be read as a plea for 
extending the B-segment, in which the price-mechanism does operate and could be used to get a 
better price for a product of a better quality. However, hospitals are not quite that positive about 
the developments in the B-segment either. As the division manager put it: 
If you now look at the price for the first batch of B-segment DBCs, that is quite interesting, 
because what is happening to the price? You see that over the last 4 to 5 years these prices are 
harmonizing and stabilizing. You can see a national race to the bottom and I expect this to 
happen with future batches as well. And then you can have a marvellous care program with 
all kinds of care- and service activities, but it’s very unsure if this leads to a higher price. So 
especially for the B-segment we end up with a nationally fixed price. We are not allowed to 
discuss [price] with other hospitals, because then we immediately have the NMA [the 
Netherlands Competition Authority] breathing down our neck as care providers developing 
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provider power. But those insurers have so many hospitals that they exactly know what the 
average price is. 
What this respondent points out here is that, according to him, the value that is built into the 
present market is one of cost-reduction through a price-mechanism that frames quality in a 
particular way. As a consequence of this situation – that is remarkably similar in the A and B-
segment – of it being harder to sell good quality than to get rid of expensive care, the policy of 
bleeders and feeders has an ironic consequence that, where the policy aim was that healthcare 
organizations are increasingly competing with each other for the favor of the insurance 
companies based on relevant quality differences, they in fact become more alike at a not 
necessarily optimal level. None of the respondents concluded from this that the market devices 
in relation to public values were not working at all, though numerous difficulties were discussed. 
When asking the purchaser of the insurance company, who already works for 28 years for this 
insurance company, how his work has changed over those years, he replied: 
Well, what really has changed is that we’re getting a bit more of a view on quality. Hospitals 
also focus much more on that. It is not even that long ago, but if we were negotiating about 6, 
7, 8 years ago, it was really about the price and about the extra money they wanted. And to 
show that they did see more patients. And we would ask: “why do you see more patients?” or 
“why do you have waiting lists?”, and based on that we would assess if they needed extra 
money to deal with these bottlenecks, because nobody looked at: should we solve it here or 
should we solve it elsewhere? So that discussion is much less present now. And what we also 
faced, in the beginning, we would say: “we’d like to talk to you about quality”, and then they 
said: “that’s none of your business! Who are you? Just pay the bills and don’t interfere with 
other things.” And now you see, especially with medical specialists, they increasingly enjoy 
talking to insurers about what they do and what the quality [of their work] is. And then there 
are those who are very enthused, who want to make it known that they actually are really 
good or better, or special. There is a much stronger willingness to do that, but also to openly 
indicate what they do and why they do it. It has become much more transparent than about 6 
years ago. 
So though the negotiations on quality seem to have started, which most certainly is a major gain 
for hospitals, patients, insurers and policy makers, through the central position of price 
mechanisms, these very negotiations may according to the respondents in this study be shaping 
the definition of quality as one that is positively related to cost reduction. 
Given our approach, all the advantages we have described cannot be described as 
consequences of ‘the market’ nor can the problems be classified as ‘market failures’, for this 
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would separate ‘the market’ as a pure entity from the complexity of market practices. Rather, we 
take all that is going on in the present market for hospital care as a plethora of consequences that 
cannot be separated from ‘the market’ in its ideal-typical form. Given such an analysis of the 
market for hospital care we notice some of the difficulties of a market for public values in 
hospital care, and will return to this in the conclusions. We will however first turn to our next 
empirical case: the development of care-load packages for care for the disabled. 
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4 Care-Load Packages and Long Term Care 
4.1 What is the intended result? 
Since 1999, the Dutch Ministry of Health has been trying to develop a system of entitlements and 
payments for long term care that is no longer based on the average client, but tuned to the 
individual needs of each client (TK 26631, nr 1, 1999; TK 26631, nr. 14, 2001). This implies that 
delivered ‘products’ by providers will get a ‘price tag’, as in a normal market. Modernization of 
the AWBZ (General Exceptional Medical Expenses Act) was needed to enlarge choice options of 
clients. The supply-oriented long term care system was no longer equipped to serve emancipated 
citizens: 
 
Citizens adopt an emancipated attitude and express explicitly that they want to give meaning to 
life themselves and be responsible for that. Anticipating this societal development constitutes the 
most important problem of the modernization of the AWBZ. It requires such a redesign of the 
system that it meets the wishes of citizens for more freedom of choice, more choice options and 
more voice and participation. (TK 26631, nr. 14, 2001: 1) 
 
The Ministry of Health wanted to develop new financial rules for the AWBZ with the intention to 
improve customer choice and voice. According to the Ministry of Health, flexible entitlements, 
and hence individual-linked payments, are necessary for the realization of tailor-made care. 
However, the description of entitlements should not be made so abstract that clients could not 
determine if the receive ‘value for money’ (TK 26631, nr 1, 1999: 24). 
In 2007, after a long period of preparation, the Ministry of Health has introduced care 
packages (zorgzwaartepakketten - ZZP), which are a kind of individual-trailing budgets, for the 
long-term care of patients with chronic illnesses, disabled patients or those in geriatric care. 
Individual ‘indications’ and budgets are designed to provide patients with greater choice and 
control over their support arrangements. Introducing individual-trailing budgets has had 
consequences for providers who are now paid on the basis of output and are thus actively 
stimulated to attract and hold clients, since clients have more exit-options. The idea is that if 
clients are better informed about their rights or their budget, because of their better position in 
relation to their provider, they will have a better chance of satisfying their own particular needs 
and wishes. For instance, clients can choose being given either a 30 min bath or two 15 min 
showers, as stated in the ZZP user guide, prepared in collaboration with the National Patients 
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Organization, the Association of Dutch Insurers and the Dutch Ministry of Health (PWC 2009). 
On 1 January 2009 care level packages were introduced in the AWBZ.  
In the new scheme, the indication becomes tailor-made, which is translated into a ZZP. 
For 2010, there are 52 care packages (ZZPs) defined for the three sectors of intramural care, 10 
for nursing homes, 13 for people with a psychiatric problem and 29 for people with a mental 
disability. Entitlements are broadly defined within ZZPs. A ZZP describes which functions, 
including a global indication of hours per week, will be delivered, like support (BG), personal 
care (PV), nursing (VP), behavior regulation, daytime activities and treatment. In a former 
design version of the ZZP, entitlements were more strictly defined with exact hours per function. 
Another important aspect of the new system is the allowance of substitution of activities. In the 
example of figure 3 the client can, for instance, substitute between support and personal care. 
 
Figure 3. Example of a care package:  ZZP3 VG (VG = mental disability). 
 
With individual-trailing funding the budget follows the client, even if they switch to a different 
care provider, for example.  The idea is that in this new system clients could more easily switch 
to another provider or make use of different providers (more choice). According to the Ministry 
of Health, a system of output finance will trigger providers to improve the quality of care and to 
become more client oriented:  
Individual-trailing funding plays a major role in focusing on a client’s care needs and the 
associated care plan. I expect individual-trailing funding for care in kind to act as an incentive 
for care providers to provide effective, good quality care in the form of a care arrangement 
that meets the client's preferences, since the funding is not based on the institution but on the 
client with a particular care need.  (VWS 12 June 2009: 12) 
The individual-trailing budget is not the same as a personal budget (PGB), which clients can 
manage themselves and which is paid out to them. In recent publications, the Ministry explicitly 
explains that individual-trailing funding should not lead to a fully individualised model of care in 
which each and every client can and must demand their ‘rights’.  
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We must avoid creating a claim culture and giving rise to calculating behaviour, which would 
lead to a situation in which it is primarily articulate citizens who are able to demand their 
rights. This is not in the spirit of the AWBZ, which serves many vulnerable groups who are 
not always in a position to exercise proper control over their own lives.  The advantage of a 
model that is not fully individualised is that care (whether provided in an institution or not) is 
often offered on a collective or group basis. This enables added value to be achieved in the 
quality of care (health, well-being and independence). Care is also delivered on a group basis 
in small-scale housing and care facilities. This offers scope for solidarity and substitution in 
an institution. (VWS 12 June 2009: 12) 
Even though ZZPs are partly developed to empower the user of care, the ministry wants to 
prevent that this would lead to claiming and calculating clients. Nevertheless, the basic idea is 
that tailor-made finance could more easily lead to tailor-made care than the old system of 
finance. 
 
4.2 What makes markets work? 
According to many of our respondents, the long-term care sector, and especially the intramural 
part of this market, is not a real market, since there is hardly any competition in this market, 
insufficient choice, more demand than supply or providers have no latitude to negotiate about 
prices. 
Now there is s0me limited market functioning. If you just look at the intramural 
compartment, then you must be honest to say that there is really no market functioning. 
There is still a matter of scarcity. Actually, a client still cannot choose by which provider he 
wants to obtain care. Moreover, we have to deal with tariffs which can just actually vary 
between a very confined basis, between 98 and 100 percent. (Interview senior adviser, 
organization for disabled people) 
A main reason for the existence of scarcity or waiting lists is that the Ministry of Health did not 
cancel production ceilings for the AWBZ regions. Care offices therefore make production 
contracts with providers based on their production ceiling. Even though the Ministry has chosen 
for a demand-oriented finance system, it still uses supply-oriented rationing mechanisms 
(production ceilings and maximum tariffs) to protect the macro budget for health care. 
We will analyze how the new market-oriented financial regime already triggers 
healthcare providers to change their behavior and impacts on the position of clients. Even 
though the provider has hardly any room to negotiate prices and volumes with care offices, the 
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introduction of price tags affects the internal organization of the provider and the relationship 
between the provider and client.ii In the next sections, we will describe how providers have dealt 
with the new market device of ZZPs. 
 
4.2.1 More registrations in ambulatory care 
Care packages are split up in parts so that clients can make use of different providers, which 
increases customer freedom. In that case the provider has to register the activities of the client in 
various administration systems, each with its own registration rules. According to one of the 
respondents, administration has become more complex and intensive because the organization 
has sometimes to show accountability to various care offices for one client. He tells that the new 
policy rules for production contracts with the purchasing care offices are needlessly complicated: 
Now, there are care offices that say ‘we don’t purchase ZZPs with day activities for clients’, 
whereas they are entitled to day activities. That means thus that you have to account for this 
client a ZZP without day activities, but furthermore, because the client is indicated for day 
activities, you have to score and account for day activities in a different way. And, that is again 
per half a day. That implies therefore that for one client you have to show accountability at 
least two times, while you can actually do it in one way. Next, you probably have to justify 
capital expenses and transport costs, too. If you have bad luck and you have to face with 
region exceeded traffic – for instance, if the client lives in the region of DWO and falls into 
the care office DWO, but receives day activities in the region DWO as well as Haaglanden; we 
have that kind of clients – then you have to account for a ZZP without day activities, you have 
to account for day activities by DWO, and you have to account for day activities by 
Haaglanden, plus connected transport and capital expenses. Well, in what way more simple? 
But then you have of course to deal with the fact that every care office has its own 
accountability template. (Interview senior financial adviser, organization for disabled 
people). 
The provider chooses to make agreements with these special clients for a ZZP inclusive of 
daytime activities, even if clients make use of a different organization for these activities. The 
provider contracts then daytime activities to a sub-contractor. The reason to choose for this 
solution is to prevent the loss of money in case the client doesn’t go fulltime to the day centre 
and stays in the residential home – some substitution between residence and daytime activities 
is allowed for ZZPs with daytime activities, but not for ZZPs without daytime activities. Output 
finance has especially consequences for the administration of ambulatory forms of care and 
 37 
daytime activities: more registration of hours or day parts. Respondents who work at residential 
locations say that they experience no serious difference with the old system of administration.  
 
4.2.2 More attention for business processes at location level 
Individual trailing funding has increased insight in business processes. The provider is better 
equipped to benchmark locations internally. Next to issues of quality and absence due to 
sickness, the management can now compare locations in terms of economic performance. With 
the aid of ZZPs, it becomes more transparent if locations have issues of overproduction or 
underproduction. With this tool the provider can show how the location has performed 
compared to other locations in the same cluster: 
 
Look, if there is underproduction and next to that overspending, then you have to deal with a 
reinforcing effect. Then you shall call such a location to account one day, depending on the 
degree of underproduction and overspending. On the other hand, you can have of course 
locations that are doing extremely well: overproduction and underspending. That’s perfect 
you would say. All right, then you should be very strong, then you have, as a figure of speech, 
to check if the quality is still of the sort that… (Interview senior financial adviser, organization 
for disabled people). 
The improved transparency of results at location level triggers a development to adjust supply 
better to the indication. We see that the responsibility for budgetary control has partly shifted 
from the organizational level to lower levels. To balance their books, organizations used to 
shuffle funds between their various budgets (substitution). Departments that had not needed to 
spend their entire allocation were able to compensate for those departments that had overspent 
their own budgets. The organization for people with a mental disability in our case study does 
not rule out every form of substitution, however locations are nowadays more aware of their 
business results and realize that substitutions is less accepted than in the past.iii  
 
4.2.3 Making ZZPs fit to location level 
In the new financial scheme, every client brings along its own budget based on the entitled ZZP. 
To create a workable situation, the provider doesn’t strive for a complete transparency of the 
spending of the ZZP (in euros) for the client, except for some information about the hours, 
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including collective hours. Moreover, it creates some latitude for professionals and caregivers to 
anticipate fluctuations in daily need. When professionals draw up the care plan that defines the 
care that the client will receive, they don’t normally look after the ZZP directly. In that sense, 
caregivers are kept at a distance from the ZZPs. That doesn’t mean that caregivers don’t notice 
anything of the introduction of ZZPs. 
 The organization for people with a mental disability expects, for instance, that the 
personal counselor and/or location manager checks during the yearly evaluation of the care plan 
if the (new) care plan still fits with the current indication or if a re-indication is necessary. Re-
indication should also be considered by staff when the circumstances of the client decrease. 
Employees have increasingly started to realize that a good indication is important for the budget 
and with that for the workforce of their location.  
Another consequence of the new financial structure is the clustering of the same type of 
clients. In the past, there were different levels of mental disability within one group. The 
provider wants to stop mixtures of ZZP 1-2 clients and ZZP 5-7, as the level of the 
caregiver/professional should be tuned to the heaviest type of client. It is more efficient to 
cluster the same type of clients in one group. The provider doesn’t rule out the possibility that 
clients will be moved to another location.iv One of the cluster managers explained that no longer 
the client can choose every location. He said that they developed the same policy as in hospitals, 
where patients leave the IC as soon as they have recovered enough to go to another, cheaper 
ward: 
Now, that actually happens here. Here stands a large, professional team to deal with complex 
clients. Thus, they can deal with less heavy clients very well, however, and then you just get 
too less money for that place. That is pure the incentive. Only in the past, we took things 
easier, because it was paid out of the margins. Anyway, parents have of course problems with 
that. That’s where the area of tension is. If parents think this is the ideal location, but we say 
‘sorry, the indication is not enough’. Yes, that is of course difficult. (cluster manager, 
organization for disabled people). 
In the same way, location managers also better check if the new client fits with the staff of the 
location. Locations with high qualified staff look more critically at the intake if the client has 
received a high ZZP. On the other hand, location managers sometimes experience some pressure 
from above to accept a client with a high indication which they are not inclined to accept: 
 
That they sometimes have something like ‘this client with ZZP7, which brings in money, we 
place it thus to you’. And then I say: ‘Yes, stop a while! I first want to know’. ‘Yes, but it is 
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possible, it fits well.’ And then I say: ‘No, I first just want to know if this really is possible.’  
And that sometimes implies fierce discussions. (location manager, organization for disabled 
people) 
Another development is that low scale locations are not possible anymore, because of 
management costs. In the new policy of the provider, locations should have at least 24 residents, 
unless the location head is no longer connected to only one location. The idea is to build smaller 
units of six persons within one location. The new financial structure triggers the provider to 
cluster the same type of clients in order to save overhead and staff costs. Clustering of clients is 
also done for marketing reasons. The provider has started to develop product groups or service-
market combinations, which the provider can use to attract new clients.  
 
Individual-trailing funding has been developed with the idea that clients could better determine 
if they get “value for money”. However, providers search for a doable form of accountability. 
Complete transparency of the spending of the individual ZZP would require an extensive form of 
registration of hours or fixed hours for activities. Collective ways of accountability at the level of 
the location are easier for providers, especially in situations where clients live in groups and 
receive collective care. Moreover, the accountability to care offices and other stakeholders is 
easier for groups with the same type of clients and ZZPs. These solutions prevent that the 
accountability for how the organization spends individual ZZPs becomes very complicated. The 
cluster manager of the organization for people which are mentally disabled said: “The pressure 
on accountability increases; so we take a look how to make things more clear.”  
 
We have to be aware that not all these consequences are directly caused by individual-trailing 
funding (ZZPs). According to the financial adviser of the provider, lower budgets also necessitate 
the organization to develop more efficient ways of providing care or to take more notice of the 
business process. Nevertheless, ZZPs helps the provider to make more transparent which 
locations are inefficient and need to change their organization of care.  
 
4.2.4 Thinking again in terms of limits instead of possibilities 
The quality of an indication is very important in an individual-trailing system. According to the 
location manager, personal counselors have to describe stronger the disabilities in order to 
realize what the client needs. To receive a ‘good’ indication, employees need to look again in an 
outmoded way to clients. Employees have to make a paradigm shift when they prepare an 
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application for a care package; it becomes a transformation from ‘possibilities’ back to ‘limits’. 
This is a difficult, uncomfortable shift for some of the employees: 
There are personal counselors who made very easily the turn to look more critically. However, 
there are personal counselors who became entangled with the idea that you have to start from 
the good things of the client, and not from what the client cannot do. Those had described 
very well what the client can do, but they didn’t realize that the client was able to do that all as 
a result of the presence of support. Therefore, those personal counselors have struggled very 
much: ‘I don’t get the indication away; this he can and that he can still do.’ Than you have to 
say: ‘Yes, you have to think away the support too. Can he then still do that?’ (location 
manager A, organization for disabled people) 
Interestingly, these solutions are not interpreted as a form of ‘upcoding’ or fraud, but as a 
way to guarantee that clients receive the care they need. In the same way, making a 
paradigm shift during the request for an indication can be interpreted as part of the 
professional responsibility for organizing enough care for the client. 
Some clients have problems with this new way of thought too. For instance, people with a 
non-congenital brain injury (NAH) receive a ‘better’ indication if they would have used the 
label mental disability (VG) instead of physical disability (LG). According to one of the 
respondents, this is partly a flaw of the system, which allows a lower budget for physical 
disability (LG) than for mental disability (VG). People with a NAH receive now LG ZZPs, but 
in practice they also experience cognitive problems. However, they have problems with the 
qualification VG, which they interpret as a stigma.v These examples show that the 
individual-trailing system creates a tension between the symbolic meaning and the financial 
interest of labels or applications. 
 
4.2.5 More clarity to clients about the received care 
The development of product groups or service-market combinations suggests some form of 
standardization. We have to be aware that this is only a minimal form of standardization, since 
the provider doesn’t search for standardization in terms of concrete activities, hours or Euros. 
ZZPs are only used to describe in general terms what the client could and could not expect from 
the provider. Respondents mention that ZZPs have the advantage of making clearer and more 
plain which care will or won’t be delivered by the provider. The ZZP can be used as a tool to start 
a dialogue with clients or to check if “you can realize what you advocate”. According to the 
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financial adviser of one of the organizations, the provider can now better substantiate what is 
possible: 
Okay, that was of course not possible in the old system. It was just an indication for residence 
and for care. Okay, then you have emancipated clients who think that everything is normally 
possible. And now you can make clear that, that … much is possible, however within the 
limits of. If you have chosen for something at a given moment, yes, that applies for me and 
that applies for you too. Look, if I buy a new car, which means that on a given moment I can’t 
buy, let us say, a new bike or new audio equipment or place a new dormer. I mean, I can 
spend my euro only one time. In that sense you can make things more transparent. (Financial 
adviser, organization for disabled people) 
However, according to our respondents, clients’ advocates almost never start a dialogue about 
the amount and quality of care with the aid of a ZZP. They are mostly interested if the care is all 
right or if everything goes well with the client. In that sense, the ZZP is not or scarcely used by 
clients as an instrument for demand-driven care. At this moment, there are also not many clients 
or advocates that deliberately select providers, even though one of the providers notices 
internally that some partly outdated locations are not so popular anymore. Moreover, there are a 
few choices like the ability to choose between two showers of fifteen minutes or one bath for half 
an hour. Most respondents expect that this will increase in the future. However, there are client 
groups for whom the ideal of more choice and options will not apply, for instance people with 
autistic disorder in the highest ZZPs. They need a clear structure in their life. Or, part of the 
clientele of nursing homes has reached a life stage where people have no longer a large demand 
for luxury lifestyles. The demand for extras or luxury, such as a large apartment, happens before 
this life stage. 
Interestingly enough, individual-trailing funding tends to strengthen the position of the 
supplier, too. As shown above, ZZPs clarify which services should or should not be delivered. In 
other words, with the aid of these financial instruments, care can be better attuned to the 
providers’ possible options. It also becomes easier to determine when a client’s demands are not 
‘reasonable’ and when to say ‘no’ to clients. Under the guise of demand orientation, clients are 
disciplined to fit their demand with the ZZP they receive. 
ZZPs thus act as a countervailing power against providers who are not sufficiently client-
oriented. On the other hand, providers can also use the same market device to reinforce their 
own position vis-a-vis demanding clients. That providers retain a degree of power is inherent in 
the policy, since the Ministry Health wanted to prevent claiming and calculating behaviour of 
clients. However if, providers gain more power than the patient, then the policy would be 
counterproductive. Tailor-made finance is not automatically the same as tailor-made care. 
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4.2.6 More care with the aid of private initiatives 
Since long term care is publicly financed by the AWBZ, many clients or their advocates expect 
that everything will be delivered by the provider. However, that is not always the case. For 
instance, providers don’t have enough personnel to cope with clients who want to walk outside as 
soon as the weather is fine. There are two options for providers to increase the amount of care: 
(1) informal care and volunteers or (2) private paid services. We will discuss in this section to 
what extend providers make use of these two forms of private initiative and how ZZPs are related 
to these private options. 
The increasing role of informal carers and volunteers 
At this moment, the provider solves special requests as walking outside with the aid of 
volunteers. Informal carers and volunteers are very important for improving the well-being and 
offering special services. The provider has, for instance, several buses which are financed by fund 
raising and are run by 40 volunteers. These buses bring people to day activities, are used for 
collective pleasure trips and can be demanded by individual clients (e.g. for visiting family 
members). In the last case clients have to pay only petrol costs. Another special project is the 
own boat financed by the Foundation of Friends of the provider and run by pensioned skippers.  
The provider is very proud on this specially built boat with a lift, which can transport 10 persons 
with a wheelchair. This creates a lot of well-being, according to one of the respondents. People 
have only to pay petrol costs. Respondents admit that the role of volunteers and informal carers 
has become more important: 
 
I think that it is very important for the client, because volunteers and informal carers can 
offer something, which we can’t manage due to lack of time and finance deficits. A part of the 
ZZPs is removed in order to get to the core of care. And all extras are hardly possible. Thus it 
is very important for the client, for clients who have a need for this, since not everyone has a 
need for this. And, it is also important for us, because if the client is satisfied, it is nice for us 
too and it works easier and finer if he had a nice day (interview care adviser, organization for 
elderly care). 
The care adviser explains that employees value informal carers highly. Nevertheless, they still 
hesitate to ask explicitly for more help from informal carers, because most people expect that 
everything will be done by the institution. The executive of the provider also mentions that 
professionals find it difficult to transfer the responsibility for the client to somebody else. 
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I find that we utilize and apply insufficiently the possibilities of informal care. Especially in the 
intramural part there is a little bit the attitude of ‘this is our patient and we do everything’. There 
is some change really necessary in my view; that our personnel on the shop floor learns much 
more to deal with informal care (interview executive, organization for elderly care). 
 
Respondents explain that budget constraints make it more difficult to offer more than ‘basic 
care’. We should acknowledge that these developments, including the current debate about the 
separation of care and residential services, could also lead to a re-framing of what ‘basic care’ is. 
Some activities will then be reframed from ‘care’ into ‘well-being’, which could imply that they 
are no longer part of the publicly financed health care system.  
 
Hesitant development of private paid extras 
Private finance creates another option to offer more than is possible within the budget that is 
financed by the AWBZ. We researched an organization for elderly care, which had already a few 
years ago the ambition to develop plus packages. Commercial activities are seen as an attractive 
improvement to the healthcare system, especially because they are presented as extra options 
above the current care packages. That is why they are called ‘plus packages’. The executive of that 
organization said in 2007 that he wants to develop products that could make life more pleasant 
for his organizations’ residents: 
 
If people say, ‘‘I’d like to…’’ then we could say, yes that’s possible, but it will mean extra effort 
for the staff. We can arrange it for you but will cost you a specific amount. If they say ‘‘We 
want our Mum or Dad to have a one-hour walk outdoors every day’’ then we’d have to say 
sorry, that’s not included in the standard care package, although we can do something about 
it. We will arrange that for you, but that means we will have to send you a ‘plus package’ bill. 
(Executive, interview 2007) 
In contrast to the former ambitions of this provider, the supply of plus-packages or commercial 
activities develops very slowly. According to our respondents, there is still a limited range of 
products and services, like food and beverage for people, washing cloths, TV at bedside and the 
rent of a room for birthday parties. Services with out-of-pocket payments are mostly offered for 
other people and not so much for the own clients. Until now, there is not much demand of clients 
for more services (interview care adviser). 
The offering of paid extras in the publicly funded part of the market is a complicated 
matter, because clients and their advocates still have the expectation that everything will be 
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delivered by the provider (interview care adviser). That people from the neighbourhood have to 
pay for services is clear. Organizations who want to introduce plus packages must make the 
difference clear between what falls under standard care and what is regarded as extra care. If you 
offer clients the option to buy extra services, then you cannot deliver these extras as part of your 
regular care.  ZZPs can be used to make clear what the limits of publicly funded institutional care 
are.  
However, the Dutch public financed system of long term care does not have a tradition of 
paying for services, except for income-related contributions for residential care. Clients and 
employees expect that everything what is needed to improve quality of life should be delivered 
within the possibilities of the budget of the provider. Caregivers use a broad definition of 
activities that could be part of ‘normal care’ depending on the individual situation of the client, 
such as visiting a supermarket to buy something for the client or doing the clients’ account for 
them. A system of plus-packages requires a clear dichotomy between basic care and other 
services; however vague demarcations also lead to good care (Grit and De Bont 2010). The 
difference between care and other services is not always clear.  Is assistance for walking outside 
part of the basic care or is this the responsibility of the family, volunteers or other private 
initiatives. The manager cure explains that these kinds of activities also improve the well-being 
and health of clients – clients, for instance, sleep better if they go outside for some movement. 
Employees say they find it difficult being able to offer some clients a specific service and 
then having to say no to other clients who cannot afford this service.  One of the respondents 
expects that employees would find it difficult to start with payments for people who want to walk 
outside with the aid of professionals two times per week.  
 
I estimate that employees find this pitiful, because the other has no money and thus doesn’t 
go outside. Anyway, that will also give a change of thought. Employees are inclined to treat 
everyone at the same level. I think that they find it pitiful and annoying that some do, some 
don’t (interview care adviser, organization for elderly care).  
This does not mean that no differences are accepted within the institution. It is already normal 
that people from outside have to pay for the services. In the same way, if residents call for a taxi, 
nobody would protest in terms of inequity. Or if family members make a difference, employees 
will react positively on active family members: ‘because that is then a nice daughter or nice son 
who comes to do that and then it’s a habit’ (interview care adviser). Problems arise if employees 
themselves have to make differences in, for instance, opportunities to go outside: 
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That feeling is different when one of the employees is paid to come to do that. That is 
different from someone calling a taxi to go outside. (..) They in principle have no problems 
with volunteers, however, according to me, if we make the difference through the payment 
factor ourselves, that will be very difficult for employees. I don’t have much problems with 
that, but for most employees this is really difficult, because they also see that some people 
remain sitting at the table (interview care adviser, organization for elderly care). 
Even though making differences by the provider is very complicated, respondents see some 
opportunities if the provider can make clear that it is more than basic care. Asking contributions 
for a concert is more accepted than for assistance to walk outside. The first example can be 
presented as an activity that is not care, but something where people normally have to pay for. If 
extra paid services come close to professional care, ethical objections will start to arise. 
According to respondents, caregivers do not want to make different classes of care. Interestingly, 
individual-trailing funding could be used to make more clear what is basic care and what people 
have to pay for. 
 
I think that if you explain that well, that it is thus something extra on top of the normal 
package, and those discussions we are in any case to make with the transformation to ZZPs, 
in the sense of what is your need and what would you like more, and what to do if that goes 
beyond the package. We have therefore now a good reason to explain this; you can make this 
visible now with the aid of those ZZPs. Then people themselves have the choice. As you also 
hear, this is not fair and if someone has no money, how do deal with that? These are the more 
ethical issues that play a role. Some people say then ‘I have a smaller car than my neighbour. 
Is that then also not fair?’ That is a tricky issue, that is still really complicated. (interview care 
adviser, organization for elderly care) 
This implies that before offering extra paid services, the provider needs more insight in business 
processes. The executive explains that she wants to know first what the provider is supposed to 
do from the AWBZ, because the provider should not deliver privately financed extra services if 
this could also be part of basic care. This is a complex matter, since professionals and caregivers 
are traditionally not very concerned about the role of money and are inclined to do as much as 
possible for their clients. The new financial system of ZZPs is used for making more transparent 
what should be part of the publicly financed compartment and hence what could be offered by 
plus packages.  
 
Well, that’s an enormous turn to make that transparent; what all our people are actually 
doing. Only if we know that, we can search for what fits into the publicly financed part and 
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what would we like to do extra and what we will ask for this. We had to make that turn this 
year. However the complexity is of such a nature that we have said: lets shift this to 2011. Let 
us use 2010 to analyse further what we deliver actually, how our care arrangement is 
organized from the ZZPs and where we have some latitude. (Executive, organization elderly 
care) 
Notwithstanding that the market device of ZZPs is developed for the publicly funded part of 
long term care, providers use these devices to stimulate or initiate private initiatives. 
 
4.3 Values in this market 
4.3.1 Two forms of internal solidarity 
Traditionally, providers employed a kind of internal solidarity through financial substitution 
where departments with an overflow of money compensated departments that had overspent 
their own budgets. This solidarity was needed since the provider received an average budget for 
every client. With the introduction of individual-trailing funding internal solidarity isn’t 
abolished; however providers give other interpretations of solidarity. 
 The provider for people with a mental disability in our research has chosen to maintain 
this solidarity both at the level of the location as well as the provider. There is room for 
substitution between locations in specific situations, even though this mechanism is or will be 
used less frequently than in the past. In our former research, the provider was more concerned 
that substitution would not be possible anymore in the future. They expected that 
underspending would no longer be accepted in a system of individual-trailing funding. If the 
right to care has become defined by patient budgets, any shifting of funds between budgets could 
increasingly being interpreted as in conflict with the rights of individuals and thus gets the 
connotation of trickery, even fraud: 
 
You know, we used to shunt budget money around our departments and between patients. 
Nowadays you couldn’t get away with that. If I did try it, I wouldn’t be able to explain my 
expenditures to the accountant or to clients. I’d run into accounting problems. (Division 
manager, care organization for the mentally disabled, 2007) 
Nowadays, the provider has chosen to keep intact some form of substitution at the level of the 
organization. One respondent explained that their organization is prepared to defend that 
something will be deducted from the care package in order to give to specific groups the care 
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they need. He stated that this is part of their societal responsibility: “We find it so important that 
you can give extra care when someone needs extra help. (..) You can explain that story.” 
 This organization tempers the problem of a ‘wrong’ indication by loosening the 
requirement that the indications of every ZZP group should fit with the budget of the location or 
by a long, smooth and careful transition to a way of working that is more in accordance with the 
height of individual-trailing funding. This prevents problems of accessibility or a lowering of the 
quality of care for some specific groups, like NAH-clients and people with an extreme care need. 
 
Another provider, the Gemiva-SVG Groep, has explicitly chosen for only solidarity at the level of 
the location. The organization realizes that the new financing system of ZZPs implicate that some 
locations will receive more money, whereas others have to sacrifice some of their budget. 
  
If it might turn out that a location needs to tighten their belt, then it could not be explained 
why we should not cooperate with that, for the government finds that these clients have to 
make do with less care than what they receive till now. If this results in a deficit of care for the 
client, we have to check if we, together with the client, can get a higher indication. But if that 
is not possible, then is democratically decided – with the approval of the parliament – that we 
have to allocate the scarce AWBZ money this way and no other. The opposite is of course true 
too. If clients have a right to more and more intensive care in a location and there also arises 
budget for this, we will and should deliver that too! (De Gemiva-SVG Groep, News letter 
October 2008) 
In this example, solidarity is partly placed outside the organization: the degree of solidarity is the 
responsibility of society or its representatives, that is: parliament. In that sense, individual-
trailing funding decreases the latitude and responsibility of the provider. 
 
4.3.2 Another form of distributive justice 
People receive an indication based on need. However, if people with this indication (ZZP) go to 
the provider, the care package is transformed partly from ‘need’ into ‘economic demand’. This 
happens not so much at the individual level, but at the collective level of the location. Within the 
collectivity of the location, equity of ‘demand’ will then become an important consideration, 
besides equity of need. Every demand for care, as described in the indication, is taken equally 
seriously by the healthcare organization. Since every demand based on indication or budget is 
taken equally serious, shuffling budgets between locations is considered inappropriate. As we 
already showed, this idea is not completely implemented in our case study. 
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Our study shows that distributive justice could get a new meaning with the introduction 
of market elements in healthcare, differing significantly from the old meaning of distributing 
care through organizations. Within the internal allocation of resources, the distributing principle 
of ‘need’ is more or less transformed into the principle of ‘economic demand’. This happens only 
at the level of the location; within the location, care can still be distributed according to the 
principle of need. However, one of our respondents expects that in the future supply would be 
fitted more closely to the indication. This already happens in a moderate, indirect way, because 
people with the same care packages are more clustered together in one group and these care 
packages become more relevant for the supply of care. 
  The increased transparency influences the distribution of resources too. Individual-
trailing funding could prevent that the loudest voices receive most care. For that reason, some 
respondents admit that the new version of allocation is fairer than the old system. 
 
 
4.3.3 Collaboration of market mechanisms and new initiatives of civil society 
Interestingly, the tendency of more market mechanisms seems to go hand in hand with the 
stimulation of new initiatives from civil society or the social network. Care packages could also 
be used to make clearer what is part of institutional care and what should be done by the family 
or volunteers. The care giver can now more easily ask family members to accompany the client 
(with a relatively low ZZP) when he or she needs to visit the doctor. Or, the location can better 
show that the staff could not do everything that is needed for the welfare of the client. ZZPs can 
be used as a kind of expectation management, which could trigger family members to become 
more active. In the last decade, providers have developed a more active volunteer policy.vi 
Moreover, some respondents acknowledge that an active pool of volunteers could be a 
positive message in the marketing strategy of the provider. Next to professionals, volunteers 
could create an advantage to competitors. The executive of the organization for elderly care 
explains how the provider became more aware of this competition element: 
 
In the past, we didn’t do that, because we didn’t have the new boat for that long. We had an 
old boat and we had those buses for years too. However, you didn’t make known that, you just 
did that. People talked about that and people in the region did really know that, but you 
didn’t present such an image.  Nowadays, we are doing that more. Also, in all our public 
relations (interview executive, organization for elderly care). 
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In the same way, selling services (meals, drinks, leisure activities) to people in the neighborhood 
is increasingly becoming part of a marketing strategy to attract potential clients. Respondents 
say that locations did not open up their doors in order to generate huge direct revenues (sales). 
This was done for the ideological reason to bring in society within the institution: “we are more 
than a building in the neighborhood”. Nevertheless, there are indirect effects in terms of the 
market, because it is a good marketing strategy. 
Both trends of an increasing role of the market and civil society fit with a more moderate 
role of government, which allows more space for private elements. We have to acknowledge that 
the stimulation of civil society is not only the consequence of the retreat of the state, which 
dumps some problems over the fence. The positive effects are also caused by the introduction of 
market mechanisms in health care. 
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5 Conclusions on Making Markets for Public Values 
As we hope to have shown, the market practices under study have complex relations to public 
values. What ‘the market’ is and what ‘public values’ are, is never clear, fixed or static. Rather, 
these domains are emergent and co-construct each other. Our approach of studying the process 
of the composition of market practices and public values, not explaining positive effects as 
‘natural’ effects of well-functioning markets and problems as ‘market failures’, has allowed us to 
analyze the work that is needed by many actors to produce such effects. It also opens up the 
study of “markets as political issues” (Barry and Slater 2002, pg. 287) as it allows us to analyze 
the ways in which markets and public values shape each other. If market devices shape public 
values in specific ways, rather than merely implementing such pre-defined values, the 
composition of market practices is an empirical domain that is directly relevant for the state. 
Government agents will want to understand how this shaping takes place, with what 
consequences and alternative possibilities to try to remedy undesired shapings. 
 In our analysis, the market practices for hospital care and long term care shape specific 
public values through the development of the market devices of DBCs and ZZPs. In both cases 
the aim seems to be to increase choice for either an individual client (ZZPs) or for both clients 
and insurance companies (DBCs) that then should result in an incentive for quality improvement 
and diversification of hospitals or institutions for care for the disabled. Ironically, our case 
studies show that rather than facilitating diversification, they both may produce the opposite 
result of organizational isomorphism (Powell and DiMaggio 1991). Also, they may lead to a 
specific operationalization of the public value of quality that is shaped in terms of the financial 
instrument. In the hospital market quality that was hardly on the agenda in discussions among 
hospital representatives and insurance companies, this public value has now become an issue of 
considerable focus during their negotiations. However, what quality is, has shifted substantially 
through the market arrangements in which actors privilege price-mechanisms and assume those 
to be easily quantifiable proxies for other public values. At present, quality easily comes to be 
defined in terms of cost-savings, which has lead to substantial gains in the affordability of care 
and reduction of length of stay in most hospitals, which, given that each unnecessary day in a 
hospital is both a societal cost and a risk for patients, is a substantial improvement. Yet, this 
specific definition of quality sits uncomfortably with notions of quality that do not involve cost-
savings. In our cases, these other definitions of quality were not only voiced by care 
professionals, but also captured for example in the performance-indicators of the Dutch 
Healthcare Inspectorate. This shows that the fact that quality has come to be defined as cost-
saving is not merely a consequence of a lack of quality information and the oft-encountered issue 
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of ‘information asymmetry’. Even where information on quality is readily available during 
negotiations, price seems to rather dominantly shape what counts – in that very literal, 
calculative sense – as quality. Information may be available but still not be consequential if 
finance aspects are so much easier to calculate and other quality aspects are both more slippery 
and less convenient to some actors. This result is not unique to this market arrangement: 
financial aspects were even more defining in times of fixed budgets that tended to be consumed 
towards the end of the year and lead to closing down operation theatres for some surgical 
procedures until the start of the new financial year. It is hard to imagine a more dominant link of 
quality being defined by financial aspects. 
The point we want to make therefore is not that with these new market devices, price or 
money has become an issue. Nor do we want to pose it as problematic that public values are 
shaped in the practice of operationalizing them in market devices: means always change and 
translate the aims they were supposed to ensure. We therefore consider this a fact of life. But if 
this is the case, this crucially points to the importance of the composition rather than 
implementation of public values through markets or other policy arrangements. The 
composition of markets for public values can neither operate under the assumption of a clear 
distinction between aims and means (Latour 1999). Such distinctions remove crucial normative 
work in the shaping of our welfare states to the realm of the technical operationalization of 
public values. 
As we have shown, the market devices studied here have at times quite positively shaped 
the relation between public values like affordability, quality and access. Long waiting lists that 
were so common under the budget-driven system have virtually vanished and quality that comes 
at a lower cost is put centre stage, which, as the purchaser of the insurance company pointed out, 
is a substantial change in comparison to the situation before the introduction of DBCs. In elderly 
care, the value of solidarity in the form of voluntary service to disabled clients is substantially 
strengthened through the development of the financial instrument of ZZPs. This consequence 
puts civil society not in opposition to the market of care for the disabled but strengthens that 
value through market arrangements. Still, at other times, financial instruments reshape quality 
in ways that sit uncomfortably with prevailing notions of quality, which is why we stress the 
importance of empirically scrutinizing such translation effects and the importance of the 
composition rather than the implementation of healthcare markets. 
Based on this approach, one of the findings that we encountered in our research is that in 
practice market devices at times also seem to undo the very aspects that they were supposed to 
strengthen according to the policy aims. Where market devices have often been studied as 
shaping the setting in line with the assumptions under which they were expected to operate 
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according to policy aims – generally captured under the heading of market mechanisms being 
‘performative’ (MacKenzie 2004; MacKenzie, Muniesa, and Siu 2007) – the market devices we 
studied often made the practices under which they were supposed to operate less favourable to 
the policy aims – a phenomenon that has been called ‘counterperformative’ (MacKenzie 2007). 
In the case of DBCs one of the policy aims of the market was that it would lead to diversity 
through the specialization of hospitals that would aim at outperforming their competitors. 
Ironically, the practice of keeping in feeders and getting rid of bleeders, in combination with the 
definition of quality as cost-saving and national semi-standards of the DBC purchasing guide 
make hospitals more similar rather than more diverse. This shows that the current isomorphism 
is not merely institutional or a failure of the market as intended by policy-makers, but is actually 
built into the financing structures and negotiation infrastructure of hospital care. Also, it may be 
necessary to make negotiations doable. 
 Similarly, the care-load packages that were supposed to lead to increased choice for 
disabled clients, resulted in practice to a homogenization of care units that require similar care-
loads in one group to be cost-effective in their care-delivery and staffing. Of course this could be 
seen as advantageous in terms of cost assessments, as this centralizes more qualified and 
expensive personnel. However, the policy aim that client choice would be the driver for 
competition and quality is less likely to materialize if clients have fewer institutions to choose 
from. Even if these reduced options are not seen as a reduction of choice but merely as a 
different framing that leads to more affordable care on a macro level, one of the core aspects of 
quality that disabled clients have persistently shown to be crucial to them, being the geographical 
proximity to their dear ones, has been reduced. A definition of quality that excludes distance at 
the benefit of costs may be a convenient outcome on the level of affordability of care, but is at 
present a somewhat unintended outcome of the instrument of the ZZP that may require further 
scrutiny and a more explicit policy decision on whether this is the kind of trade-off that is to be 
made between this aspect of quality and the affordability of care. Moreover, other actors also use 
the same instruments that should empower users. Individual-trailing budgets are designed to 
provide clients greater choice and control over their support arrangements, however these 
budgets could also be used by providers to say “No” to the demanding client; it becomes a 
mechanism of managing demand. Care is being tailor-made to the cluster of individual ZZPs in 
the location. 
 Through this empirical analysis of the shaping of public values in market practices, we 
now return to one of the core questions in this study. Public values are not ‘defined’ by politics, 
‘formulated’ in policy aims and ‘implemented’ by policy actors. They are shaped in a dynamic 
process of interaction between policy instruments such as market devices and prevailing values 
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in healthcare practices. The question this crucially raises is what the role is for the state in the 
composition of public values and healthcare markets. Realizing that public values are shaped in 
practices should, according to us, not lead to the re-politicization of such policy domains. Direct 
involvement by politicians in the shaping of healthcare markets tends to lead to the problems 
associated with incident-politics and calls for democratization through participatory instruments 
are practically cumbersome and theoretically problematic (Berg 1998). Also, they presume that 
ultimately, the composition of markets that are to ensure public values can be completely 
regulated and controlled, which empirically seems hard to imagine. 
 An alternative role for the state in the composition of market devices and public values is 
to accept that such values are shaped in practice and that therefore the relationship between 
policy aims and policy consequences can never be fully captured through a logic of 
implementation. For this the process is too unpredictable and the consequences too unforeseen. 
Such unpredictability and dynamics is better captured in an experimental role of the state. A 
state would thereby not see market devices as an operationalization of policy aims, but would see 
market developments as experimental devices in which the aim is a good composition of public 
values. A general outline of these values will guide the experiment and the experimental set-up, 
but the consequences will need a kind of ‘formative evaluation’ (Øvretveit 1998), in which the 
production of evaluation results is not postponed till the end of an experiment, but is fed back 
into the experiment in terms of adjustments of the experimental setting and the devices that are 
being deployed. 
If we were to re-conceptualize the Dutch policy initiatives of making markets for public 
values as a real-time experiment, this would perhaps turn the present study into a part of the 
formative evaluation and would allow us to draw upon our findings to see what adjustments in 
the experimental setting may be interesting and productive. In that light, our finding of the 
strong influence of financial instruments in shaping public values like quality may be a good case 
in point. Given that finding and drawing upon the existing economic literature about non-price 
competition (Gaynor and Vogt 1999; Gaynor 2006; Pope 1989; Hammer 1999), it would be 
interesting to experiment with market developments that do not ascribe a privileged status to 
financial devices and price-mechanism. As we have shown, the de facto privileged ontological 
status for price as a mechanism often resulted in a reconfiguration of other public values in the 
light of this dominant focus on price. This often produces problems for these other values and 
point to the limitations of price-based market devices: they are calculatively convenient but at 
times counter-productive in terms of the policy aims and the public values they were to ensure. 
We therefore propose to experiment with markets for public values in healthcare in which 
affordability is ensured in different ways, while creating more space for composing other public 
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values in fuller scope. In this light, the DBC A-segment may be precisely one of the most 
promising domains of developing a market for hospital care that ensures affordability through 
macro price-setting, while the composition of the market and its competition could focus on 
other public values like quality and maintaining accessibility. The experiment of developing 
markets for this care sector would hereby be allowed to move away from extending the B-
segment and would provide an interesting new natural experiment of constructing a market in 
which other public values are put more centre stage. Of course there are substantial basic 
requirements for this experiment to stand any chance. DBCs would have to be set at a high 
enough level to cover minimal costs and of course it will not be a technocratic exercise to 
establish what these minimal costs are as this is highly dependent on quality assumptions as 
well. Yet, this would in principle not be a harder task for government than it is for insurance 
companies, though it would of course require a more dynamic maintenance of A-segment DBCs 
then presently found. This new twist to the experiment of market devices and public values is 
encouraged by the fact that ZN is presently discussing the development of a DBC purchasing 
guide for the A-segment, which would obviously be required to frame an outline of quality 
without setting this as a formal norm. A-segment DBCs would need to be moved out of the 
present budgetary structure of inpatient days to make use of the commodification of DBCs as 
related to actual care processes but this would in principle not be more complicated than for B-
segment DBCs. Also, collective negotiations between insurers would be problematic and would 
probably need to be prohibited, just as it is now for the B-segment. 
 Another interesting field for experimentation would be the inclusion of the role of GPs in 
the steering of patient streams. GPs in the Netherlands are positioned in such a way that their 
referral practices produce specific definitions of quality. Their gate-keeping role makes them 
crucial players in a market for hospital care and the composition of public values in that market. 
Despite their crucial role in steering patient streams, GPs have largely been overlooked by all 
players in the construction of a market for hospital care. We propose that this is largely due to 
the fact that they are part of a separate financing structure, which makes them invisible when 
privileging financial instruments in the construction of markets for policy domains such as 
healthcare. However, this very absence of financial incentives may make them particularly 
interesting players in the composition of a market for public values if affordability can be 
ensured through other governance arrangements. In this experimentation lessons could be 
learned from the situation in the United States of America, with its health maintenance 
organizations (HMOs). In the same way, information agents like the GP can also be included in 
the long term care market such as MEE, which already advises clients or their advocates to  
increase their ability to live independently. However their role is not so much to offer support 
 56 
and aid by making a choice for a provider but rather to offer help in drawing up a care plan. 
Information and advice are probably more helpful for the empowerment of the user of care than 
financial devices like individual-trailing budgets. 
Such suggestions about the shaping of markets for public values are not to be taken as 
design suggestions that aim to ‘fix’ markets for public values. They rather point to tentative ways 
of exploring experimental ground for the task of composing rather than implementing public 
values. Given our findings, quantifying public values using one and the same measure of 
financial worth to analyze all the others seems to produce substantial limitations to the 
experiment. Moving the quantification of public values away from this close-to-perfect financial 
measuring device will require developing many different and not always equally neat 
‘valuemeters’ that would “make visible and readable the value judgments” (Latour and Lépinay 
2009, p. 16) actors make. Such valuemeters may prove to be crucial cognitive equipment of the 
thinking state (Latour 2007) and for the shift to an experimental state that is actively involved in 
the composition of public values. 
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Notes: 
                                                
i Such as in the recent claim by Pieter Kalbfleisch, Board member of the Netherlands Competition 
Authority (NMa), that “without market mechanisms there is no innovation in healthcare” (Gibbels 2010). 
The proof for such claims tends to be anecdotal.	  
ii	  The new financial regime has serious consequences for one of our case studies, the organization for 
people with mental disability. In contrast to many providers, the total budget has decreased for this 
provider. Besides that the new method was a correction for a regional difference in finance, the lower 
budget was also the consequence of some specific characteristics in the supply of the provider, such as 
relatively much low scale locations and the target group non-congenital brain injury (we will discuss these 
problems later).	  
iii A location manager said that she is alerter if all potential benefits are secured. A PB client appeared to 
pay only for short-stay accommodation and not for showering assistance, after which the tariff is adjusted. 	  
iv We have to acknowledge that in the past clients were also moved for ideological reasons (participation in 
society) by providers.	  
v The provider has raised this matter at the VGN, the national association of organizations for disabled 
people.	  
vi However for some groups, it is difficult to attract volunteers.	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